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INTRODUCTION 
Unanswered age-old questions lurk behind disruptions caused by cutting-
edge information technologies, associated social practices, and the various 
legal solutions that follow.  This essay takes up one of them.  How might 
one sketch relationships between knowledge and law? 
Many people who think about knowledge in terms of law and policy 
think about using law to produce more knowledge, because new knowledge 
is an important output of social systems.  Others think in terms of using law 
to ensure access to knowledge, because existing knowledge is an important 
input to social systems.  When these two modes of thinking are combined, 
for in fact they are two modestly different ways to conceive of a single 
relationship, they produce a scheme of knowledge and knowledge policy 
framed in terms of what intellectual property lawyers recognize as the 
metaphorical “balance.”  Law and policy should provide incentives to 
innovate, create, and distribute knowledge, which may include powers to 
control and limit the use of knowledge.  Public policy should also supply 
rights to access and use knowledge.  The scheme should be designed to 
keep these interests in some equilibrium, which is not to say that they have 
to be weighted equally or that the equilibrium is always stable.1  The 
various legal regimes of knowledge, usually represented as patent and 
copyright law, need both some incentive and some access.  The ground 
shifts; the equilibrium sometimes shifts; “balance” is a verb as well as a 
noun. 
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 1. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996) (explaining and critiquing the basic model).  The 
competition-of-interests model is not limited to intellectual property contexts. Cf. Michael J. 
Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 
170 n.177 (2000) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)) (noting the common authorship of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor for the 
First Amendment and the “aesthetic nondiscrimination” principle in copyright law). 
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As an account of the relationship between law and knowledge, the power 
of this sketch is limited.  Those limits are twofold.  First, each of the two, 
highly stylized dimensions of the account draws its positive force primarily 
from the negative field that surrounds the other.  Such a model can have 
enormous power and utility within narrow domains.  If the legal system has 
to decide whether a researcher’s use of a patented invention is infringing or 
exempt as an “experimental” use, then the balance metaphor may be 
extremely helpful.  In a broader sense, however, the balance model cannot 
serve as a justification for copyright and patent law, in the sense that neither 
copyright nor patent can be claimed to be legitimate and authoritative with 
respect to arguments about balance.  Incentive and access arguments are 
grounded in further social and cultural arguments about knowledge.  To the 
extent that they make claims to legitimacy and authority on behalf of the 
law, they support those claims only indirectly or implicitly, via claims about 
knowledge and specifically via claims in respect of the legitimacy and 
authority of knowledge itself.2  If we do not have a firm grasp of the latter, 
our grasp of arguments about the legitimacy and authority of related law 
will also be weak.  As a justification for law based on knowledge, the 
balance metaphor omits important dimensions. 
Second, to the extent that the balance metaphor and its elements do make 
claims about knowledge and do offer justifications for legal regimes, those 
claims are temporal.  One temporal claim is that law precedes knowledge, 
so that law is needed (first) so that knowledge will be produced (second).  
This claim is represented in the incentive portion of the metaphorical 
balance, and more generally in instrumental accounts of intellectual 
property law, both of which are parts of the long-standing Anglo-American 
justification for exclusive intellectual property rights.3  The related public 
goods account of intellectual property rights holds similarly that legal 
entitlements are necessary to overcome a failure of market processes to 
develop new knowledge.4  A second temporal claim is that knowledge 
precedes law, so that law is needed (second) in order to secure access to and 
use of knowledge (first).  This claim is represented in the access and use 
 
 2. For very different but conceptually related accounts of how knowledge, law, and 
policy might relate to culture as a whole rather than only to narrow utilitarian goals, see 
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1 (2006); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 
(2006). 
 3. The U.S. Constitution declares that the point of intellectual property law is 
“Progress,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which is to say that the law is justified by the 
production and distribution of knowledge, or something close to it.  Intellectual property 
scholarship includes instrumentalist strands that Mark Lemley refers to as “ex post” 
justifications for intellectual property rights. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Vers[u]s Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). 
 4. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1050–55 (2005). 
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portion of the metaphorical balance.5  It is also represented in justice-based 
accounts, often derived from the philosophy of John Locke, which hold that 
intellectual property rights are justified with respect to rewarding 
individuals who labor to produce knowledge, or recognizing the dignity of 
authors and inventors.6 
The point illustrated by this second limit is likewise dimensional, and it 
rounds out the point illustrated by the first limit.  Time is neither the 
exclusive measure of the relationship between law and knowledge nor an 
adequate justification for law related to knowledge.  This essay offers an 
alternative conceptual framework for understanding that relationship and 
eventually for developing justifications for knowledge law, or multiple 
justifications, grounded in space as well as in time.7 
The two are not wholly distinct, of course.  This essay argues not that 
temporal justifications are wrong, only that they are necessarily incomplete.  
Turning the point around, it should be self-evident that justifications 
grounded in spatial conceptions are likewise incomplete; they need to be 
coupled with justifications grounded in time.  But the temporal perspective 
is both well-established and largely taken for granted.  The spatial 
perspective is neither.  By sketching some notes on a geography of 
knowledge, this essay explores that omission. 
Why explore?  Lawyers and legal scholars should care about this because 
debates about the expansion and contraction of intellectual property rights 
in the twenty-first century are not only debates about whether these changes 
are good or right public policy.  Instead, they are nothing less than debates 
about law’s legitimacy and authority, in social and political terms.8  In 
theory, a discussion of justifications for law embraces justifications for the 
 
 5. Edmund Kitch’s “prospect” theory of patent rights, criticized by Lemley, supra note 
3, falls into this category. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1977).  The role of time in limiting the scope of 
intellectual property claims has been noted in copyright law, see Justin Hughes, Fair Use 
Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time:  A 
Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002), and in patent law, see Mark A. Lemley, The 
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005). 
 6. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:  Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) 
(critiquing the application of Lockean theory to modern intellectual property law); Justin 
Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998) (reviewing different constructions of personality 
interests). 
 7. Hari Osofsky wrote recently, “The dominance of the progress narrative in modernist 
thought valorized history’s focus on time while devaluing geography’s study of space.” Hari 
M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 421, 422 (2007).  For a counterpart investigation of the concept of space in the context of 
networked information policy, see Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 210 (2007). 
 8. Arguments about the legitimacy of positive law in light of background norms of 
property rights and fairness form the core of compelling narrative accounts of the modern 
patent system, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:  HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008), and the modern copyright 
system, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001). 
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very idea of law itself, including the very ideas of knowledge-related law, 
such as the whole of copyright and patent law.  In practice, that discussion 
is less interesting and useful than a narrower discussion of justifications 
both for changes to existing law and for specific legal and other cultural 
practices that depend, in part, on the law.  For practical reasons, therefore, 
this essay is directed primarily to the latter.  I note that the spatial 
perspective may scale down to the narrower issue of the legitimacy of legal 
claims concerning a particular item of knowledge—a particular 
copyrightable work of authorship or patentable invention—or may scale up 
to the far larger issue of justifications for law itself. 
For reasons having to do with its possible application to larger, 
theoretical questions, there may be something in the spatial exploration for 
philosophers and social scientists, too.  The practices of intellectual 
property law offer concrete applications for their inquiries into the nature of 
legitimacy and authority as concepts and as political categories.9  Moreover, 
modern knowledge law is not exclusively the domain of intellectual 
property law, so what follows, while grounded in close examination of 
intellectual property forms, should not be understood as limited to that 
domain.  Nor is it necessarily limited to the broad domain of intellectual 
property law, to the narrow domain of specific forms, or to any particular 
scale in between.10  The ambiguities and tensions that I identify, and the 
questions that they provoke, may be relevant to understanding science and 
scientific evidence in legal settings and to understanding aspects of free 
speech and communications law.  I leave those extensions for another time 
and place. 
How should one approach re-asking questions about the relationship 
between law and knowledge?  Rather than starting at the top of the 
conceptual ladder and scrutinizing the authentic purposes of intellectual 
property law (a task that other scholars have pursued at great length), I start 
at the bottom and use legal practice.  Bearing the geographic metaphor in 
mind, my aim is not to map domains of practice, domains of law, or 
domains of knowledge.  Instead, I explore the spaces of law and knowledge. 
My specific interest is the intellectual property license, a legal and 
cultural form that serves a central intermediary role, or what might be called 
a boundary function, in cycles of knowledge practices.  Knowledge 
circulates through a broad variety of settings and via a broad variety of 
practices:  objects, markets, firms, disciplines, prices, institutions, and so 
on.  One way to conceive of an intellectual property license is sequential.  
First, knowledge arises.  Second, it is ratified in some intellectual property 
 
 9. For two very different recent offerings in this domain, see Frank I. Michelman, 
Relative Constraint and Public Reason:  What Is “The Work We Expect of Law”?, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 963 (2002); Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL 
THEORY 387 (2002). 
 10. That is, the questions that I suggest here might be asked in the context of legal rights, 
technologies that control access to and use of knowledge, social norms, and other 
intermediary institutions. 
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right.  Third, that right gets licensed, usually as part of a commercial 
transaction.  I suggest a different conception of licensing:  that licenses 
manage transformations and transitions of knowledge from one socially or 
culturally sanctioned form or practice to another. 
At the outset, therefore, this essay frames its inquiry with spatial 
metaphors (the boundaries managed by licenses) rather than temporal ones.  
Intellectual property licenses manage conceptual spaces.  How do they do 
that?  Lawyers, scholars, and judges know a great deal about the doctrines 
of intellectual property licensing, but there are also significant gaps and 
omissions in those doctrines.  Those gaps are related to the incompleteness 
of licensing’s boundary functions.  Why and how a license should work as a 
boundary is a question of legitimacy and authority.  That question, rather 
than legal doctrine as such, is this essay’s focus.  I suggest that inadequacies 
in the law and practice of intellectual property licensing have their bases in 
gaps and flaws in our understanding of knowledge itself.  Licensing law and 
practice raise questions about the validity, authority, and legitimacy of 
intermediary legal forms.  In turn, they raise questions about the validity, 
authority, and legitimacy of the heterogeneous legal forms and social 
practices that licensing depends upon, responds to, channels, and promotes.  
They raise questions, in short, about both law and knowledge themselves.  
This essay challenges the proposition that we have a solid understanding of 
the basis of intellectual property rules in the first place, and it challenges 
that understanding on the ground that modern intellectual property practice 
itself manifests deep uncertainties regarding the nature of knowledge. 
I.  A GEOGRAPHIC METHOD 
What do we mean when we talk about knowledge?  There is the 
philosopher’s knowledge:  justified true belief, propositional knowledge, 
and knowledge how and knowledge of, all of which require careful 
delineation of justification, truth, and belief.11  There is the other 
philosopher’s knowledge, phenomenal knowledge, which is not wholly 
distinct from our experience of the world.12  Law and policy speak of 
knowledge in broader, looser, and more general terms, with a small “k” 
rather than a big “K,” perhaps.  Knowledge in the small “k” sense includes 
information about the world and ourselves, various forms and practices of 
art and science (in both classical and modern senses), tools for knowing 
(reason and belief), as well as the diverse products of knowing.  This small 
“k” knowledge includes fiction, film, secrets, and computer programs. 
I proceed in this “small k” sense.  I do so not to avoid difficult 
philosophical and definitional questions but in order to approach them as a 
lawyer might, from a perspective grounded in form and function.  I start 
 
 11. See Epistemology, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Dec. 14, 2005, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/. 
 12. See Phenomenology, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Nov. 16, 2003, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/. 
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with the premise that there is an important, complicated, but nonetheless 
intelligible conversation to be had about knowledge without getting overly 
precise about the definition of what is knowledge and what is not.  I include 
discursive knowledge, representational knowledge, and knowledge 
embodied in other forms of culture, including practices and objects.  
Knowledge embodies and encodes meaning, which can come and be 
understood at multiple layers.  Knowledge may be distinguished from 
information or data, which typically lacks inflection via meaning.  This 
distinction is not always precise, nor is it always useful.  Exploring how to 
think about distinctions among and within forms of knowledge, and 
exploring how those distinctions are manifested in and promoted by legal 
forms, is precisely what this essay is about. 
In specifying my scope, there is still a great deal to consider.  Large 
practical and conceptual questions loom over each aspect of the knowledge 
landscape.  There is the production of new knowledge.  What is new?  What 
is re-newed or re-mixed or re-organized knowledge, and where do those 
things come from, and why?  There is the detection of existing knowledge.  
Modern society (not to mention patent and copyright law) valorizes the 
innovative and the creative, but a lot of valuable knowledge, even perhaps 
most great knowledge, is quite old or is available for knowing only with 
appropriate tools or conceptual or technical methods.  What are the 
relationships between inventing or creating, on the one hand, and detecting, 
on the other?  What are the relationships between these things and a third 
broad category of questions—the storage, organization, and retrieval of 
both existing and new knowledge? 
Why do we care about any of these things?  That question, too, has 
diverse answers.  There is knowledge that is valuable for its own sake, 
knowledge that is valuable for instrumental reasons, and knowledge that is 
not valuable at all (perhaps because it is harmful, even if it is true), or that 
we do not know enough about yet to know whether it is valuable in any 
sense, or that we do not care about.  What knowledge is meant to be used, 
and why?  What is to be consumed?  Changed?  Preserved, and simply 
known?  Some knowledge, perhaps most knowledge, is meant to be shared 
and distributed.  Other knowledge is meant to remain secret, or be put only 
to limited use.  Some knowledge (again, perhaps most) has both attributes.  
There is epistemology, knowledge about knowledge, a discipline to which 
this essay might be taken to contribute. 
A geography of knowledge, and even a conceptual geography such as 
this one, can help situate these questions and some answers relative to each 
other.  Even absent maps themselves, geography may be useful partly 
because it offers ways of knowing where you are and of getting from one 
place to another, but also and importantly because it offers ways of seeing 
the world.  Geography offers the dual prospects of understanding 
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relationships of peoples and resources and of appreciating one’s place, or 
places, in context.13 
I do not suppose that we know for certain where we are starting off.  I 
emphasize what we do not know about knowledge rather than what we do.  
Joseph Conrad’s Marlow had a passion for maps.  He went looking for the 
“blank spaces on the earth.”14  I want to focus on the conceptual and 
metaphoric blank spaces of knowledge.  Not only do we know less than we 
commonly believe about knowledge law and policy and specific things like 
copyright as property, access to the public domain, or the shareability of 
information, we also know less than we might believe about broader things 
like the nature of authority that knowledge exercises and that we exercise 
through knowledge.15 
As often as not, the blank spaces of knowledge do not lie at the distant 
edges of the knowledge landscape.  Instead, they constitute parts of the 
many overlapping dimensions that inhabit the entire space.  We are not 
faced with a metaphoric map that is orderly in the center and somewhat 
uncertain at the margins.  The boundaries of various knowledge domains 
are not and cannot be clearly and neatly marked, notwithstanding both 
doctrinal and scholarly efforts to carefully segregate various normative 
domains from one another.16  In her writing on globalization, Saskia Sassen 
uses the term “analytic borderlands” to describe contested, dynamic, 
physical, and discursive conditions that characterize passage from one 
domain to another.17  The blank spaces of knowledge occupy similar 
metaphoric borderlands. 
 
 13. It is a geography in part for the reasons articulated by Julie Cohen.  The landscape of 
law, policy, and culture is “un-mapped” in both literal and metaphoric terms, even though 
we talk casually about landscapes and the public domain. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and 
Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007); cf. Keith Aoki, 
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:  Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (describing the need to reimagine the equation of territoriality 
and sovereignty in intellectual property policy in the wake of globalization). 
 14. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 108 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 2002) 
(1902). 
 15. This essay continues my earlier explorations of authority and legitimacy in 
knowledge contexts. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, The Idea of the Law Review:  
Scholarship, Prestige and Open Access, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 901 (2006); Michael J. 
Madison, Law as Design:  Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
381 (2005) [hereinafter Madison, Things]; Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software 
License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2003) [hereinafter Madison, The Software License]. 
 16. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 
(2003) (narrowing interpretation of trademark law to avoid perceived conflict with 
copyright); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (limiting scope 
of trademark rights available in devices that are the subject of patent protection); Pamela 
Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain:  Threats and Opportunities, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 147, 150 (offering a conceptual and literal “map” 
of the elements of the public domain). 
 17. See SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS:  FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL 
ASSEMBLAGES 379–86 (2006).  Julie Cohen previously borrowed Sassen’s concept in her 
discussion of networked space. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 251. 
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With this metaphorically geographic approach, and using some recent 
cases from American courts, this essay uses some recent examples of 
intellectual property licensing and litigation to outline and describe some of 
this space.  I point to how these examples of intellectual property practice 
mark not only the borderlands of both law and policy but also various forms 
of knowledge itself.  Licensing law suggests that blank spaces within, 
between, and beyond the geography of knowledge are numerous, and that 
they have a complex character.  Rather than feeding the dominant two-
dimensional balance metaphor for intellectual property law and policy, 
licensing law likewise points to multiple dimensions of knowledge and to 
questions of legitimacy and authority. 
*   *   * 
Any geographer has to bear in mind some important limitations.  Here, 
those limitations include the fact that I am not the first explorer here.  The 
questions that I am raising have been asked and answered in part in the 
context of science and technology.18  The character of authority of 
knowledge as represented in legal forms has not received as much scholarly 
attention, and where scholars have approached the question, they have 
rarely focused explicitly on questions of legitimacy as well as authority.19  
Taking small initial steps into the territory, I begin with a few landmarks—
in this context, salient recent cases that stake out the contours of some 
matters that seem to be settled and some that are not.  I do not necessarily 
take settled matters as such.  Instead, they are signs that law and policy 
have visited some places and explored some territory.  Some features are 
more salient than others.  Some operate at larger and more robust scales.  
Others are more fine grained.  Some descriptions are clear and enduring.  
Some are tentative, even speculative. 
There is the risk that the abstractions of geography will fail to relate back 
to human practice and experience.20  Framing the exploration of knowledge 
by talking about licensing law is partly an effort to address this space.  It is 
 
 18. On the related ideas of the authority of knowledge and knowledge of authority, 
which depend on hierarchies of individuals and of discourses, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, 
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977) 
(1972); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).  By 
citing Bourdieu and Kuhn, I do not mean to adopt their theories or methods, or to argue that 
they are the first to raise questions about epistemology and authority. Cf. Max Weber, The 
Three Types of Legitimate Rule, in COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (A. Etzioni ed., Hans Gerth 
trans., Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1961) (1958) (and before Weber, there was Heidegger). 
 19. Notable exceptions include Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic:  Representing 
Inventions, Constructing Rights and Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129 (2006); Annelise Riles, The 
Anti-Network:  Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the 
State, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (2008); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual 
Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge?  An Empirical Test of the 
Anti-Commons Hypothesis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11465, 
2005). 
 20. Julie Cohen is almost alone in sounding this caution in the information context. See 
Cohen, supra note 7. 
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important to explore the spaces where concept and materiality converge, 
complement one another, and conflict.  To some, an intellectual property 
license offends the sense that knowledge itself neither can nor should be 
controlled by law or otherwise.21  To others, the property interest embodied 
in the license represents the propriety that dignifies knowledge in the forms 
that society values, and the license should be valued, respected, and 
promoted as such.22  At another level altogether, contests over particular 
licenses and between particular parties are subsidiary to larger and more 
important cultural debates about the legitimacy of institutions of 
knowledge.23  In a full description of the relationships among law and 
knowledge, all of these perspectives need to be accounted for, even if they 
cannot be completely reconciled. 
Last, there are the lessons that critical geographers have taught before.24  
Geography represents history, power, and interest as well as description.  It 
does not necessarily speak objectively about the natural world, and the 
geographer has a distinct perspective and is an agent and instrument of 
power.  The found territory makes the geography.  The geography makes 
the territory being found.  Consider throughout this essay the sources of 
legitimacy and authority that are necessarily implicit in my own claims to 
knowledge.  As a cultural adventurer, I am subject to and limited by default 
frameworks with which I am most familiar:  the instinct to divide abstract 
“information” from meaning-inflected knowledge, knowledge as speech, 
and knowledge as intellectual property.  Methodologically, my approach 
represents a partial synthesis that points to but that also assumes a 
multidisciplinary, pluralistic conclusion.  I apply a bit of literary flourish to 
the scholarly argument because formal, functional, and conceptual 
approaches to problems in intellectual property licensing, as well as to 
knowledge itself, are all necessarily incomplete. 
 
 21. See Richard Stallman, Why “Open Source” Misses the Point of Free Software, 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html (last visited Mar. 23, 
2009). 
 22. On the historical and philosophical connection between property forms and 
constructs of social propriety, see Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 
in NOMOS XXXIII:  COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991). 
 23. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A. M. Sheridan-Smith 
trans., Pantheon Books 1972). 
 24. See JEREMY BLACK, MAPS AND POLITICS (2d. ed. 2000); NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, 
LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994); J. B. HARLEY, THE NEW NATURE OF 
MAPS:  ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CARTOGRAPHY (Paul Laxton ed., 2001); DAVID HARVEY, 
SPACES OF CAPITAL:  TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY (2001); DENIS WOOD WITH JOHN 
FELS, THE POWER OF MAPS (1992).  For examples of work describing the intersection of law 
and critical geography, see Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and 
Geography, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 3 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003), and 
Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?:  Local Climate Change 
Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409 (2008). 
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II.  LICENSES AND LANDMARKS 
A.  Licenses 
Intellectual property licenses mediate between knowledge forms and 
practices.  Narrowly, licenses mediate between parties to the license, 
between upstream and downstream knowledge enterprises, and between 
partners.  Broadly and conceptually, knowledge licenses mediate between 
social and cultural knowledge practices.  A license takes a knowledge 
enterprise of some social and cultural scope and encodes and represents it in 
a concrete legal form, which is then used to direct and orient that enterprise 
in some specific way in some other social or cultural setting.  “Creativity” 
and “innovation,” which are the hallmarks and watchwords of the copyright 
and patent systems respectively, become manufacturing or marketing or 
other things.  “Archiving” becomes merchandising.  “Sharing” becomes 
access.  As a result, licenses mediate between ways of thinking about 
knowledge, between what is known and unknown, what is familiar and 
unfamiliar, and what is fixed and what changes. 
As a mediator, a license is a kind of fulcrum.  Any fulcrum needs to be 
stable.  In a legal system, it also needs to be authoritative and legitimate, 
that is, accepted and worthy of that acceptance.  For these reasons it is 
important to understand what the fulcrum stands on.  History and tradition 
largely dictate the forms of classic knowledge licenses, but their legitimacy 
appears to be closely bound up with the legitimacy of the underlying 
knowledge practices. 
Consider a conventional patent licensing arrangement.  A patent owner 
uses a manufacturing license to partner with a firm that produces goods that 
embody the patented invention.  The license adopts a time-honored and 
commercially respectable documentary form.  That form recites permission 
to use the state-granted intellectual property right, and it includes a 
reciprocal royalty obligation.  A clear and centuries-old system of formal 
state authority is available to either party in case of noncompliance with the 
license.  Within the patent system itself, this is all unremarkable.  The 
license is serving a typical intermediary function.  In the context of law and 
society more generally, however, why should courts, or anyone, regard the 
legal form and its enforcement as legitimate and authoritative? 
The answer depends on a nested series of simple and powerful 
arguments, constructed metaphorically as if they were the walls of a 
medieval castle.  At the outermost point, the license assumes the legitimacy 
of the patent regime.  Moving inward, the legitimacy of the patent regime 
assumes its status as a legal system enacted according to the standard of the 
relevant state, which in American terms means Congress and the President 
following the dictates of the U.S. Constitution.  In another country, that 
standard would be internal to its political system.  In premodern intellectual 
property regimes, the legitimacy inquiry might end there.  What we would 
call an intellectual property right using today’s nomenclature might have 
MADISON FINAL3 (LOOKS GOOD ON FRANKS COMP) 3/31/2009  2:18:04 AM 
2009] A GEOGRAPHY OF KNOWLEDGE 2049 
been an exercise of pure political power.  Unlike modern patents, which are 
creatures of legislation, letters patent were once the prerogative of the 
monarch.25 
In modern contexts, however, recourse to raw political power is 
insufficient to justify law generally.  But in the intellectual property context, 
so too is recourse to the general proposition that the legitimacy of a 
democratically selected form of government suffices to justify the 
legitimacy of forms of law that are enacted and enforced by that 
government.  Under the U.S. Constitution, the legitimacy of the enactment 
of patent and copyright law depends on the social (or, if you prefer, 
political) equation of “Progress,” the constitutional standard, with the 
knowledge that the patent system supports.  Both inside and outside the 
patent system, and both today and earlier in American history, there exists a 
hypothetical but broad and powerful belief that the patent system 
encourages disclosure of innovative work and permits both appropriation of 
financial returns and cumulation of technological progress.  The 
Constitution reflects and enacts that belief.  The patent system renders 
knowledge legitimate and authoritative by wrapping it in the authority of 
the state.  I use the term knowledge broadly here; a patent is itself a species 
of codified knowledge.26  The patent system adopts and applies the 
authority of the state precisely because the relevant knowledge is legitimate 
and authoritative in the first place.  That legitimacy extends through and 
includes performance and enforcement of the license.  The license is 
recognized as legitimate and authoritative precisely because the knowledge 
that the license supports is itself recognized as legitimate and 
authoritative.27 
This is not to say that a court could or should refuse to enforce an 
intellectual property license if it decides that a particular transaction fails to 
comport with some judicial sense of “Progress.”  Nor do I argue that a 
patent system might be justified only with regard to arguments about the 
legitimacy and authority of knowledge itself.  As noted above, the patent 
system might be justified by reference to political legitimacy as such. 
 
 25. See Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents:  From 
Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 223 (2006) (describing the progressive 
“constitutionalization” of patent law as a measure designed to ensure its legitimacy).  The 
legitimacy of some monarchs was grounded in their divinity. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, 
BEYOND CAMELOT:  RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 26–29 (2005). 
 26. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008). 
 27. I am cognizant of the intransitive and passive construction here.  Who is recognizing 
the legitimacy of patented and copyrighted knowledge, and on what basis?  Patent law and 
copyright law give different answers.  Patent law relies in part on an internal perspective, the 
perspective of the skilled artisan.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom?  Evaluating 
Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004).  At 
different times, copyright law adopts internal perspectives, external perspectives, and both at 
once.  See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 
(1998). 
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In modern society, claims about intellectual property law and policy are 
closely aligned with claims about knowledge.  The nesting of the domains 
of legitimacy described in the last paragraphs is quite strong, despite being 
contingent in a historical sense.  The connection between the authority and 
legitimacy of knowledge and the authority and legitimacy of particular 
intellectual property forms is so strong, in fact, that it is rarely questioned.  
Even notable, vocal critics of contemporary intellectual property law pay 
homage to the foundational point that copyright and patent are good things, 
at bottom, and need only be tweaked to be better aligned with social and 
cultural goals.28  American courts almost universally refuse to engage in 
case-by-case analysis of whether intellectual property rights are serving 
“Progress” in a constitutional sense,29 which is itself evidence of the power 
of the regime’s foundational premises regarding what knowledge is, where 
it comes from, and what it is good for. 
The fact that the legitimacy question almost never gets asked at ground 
level, in the case of particular licenses, is precisely what makes a geography 
of knowledge an interesting proposition.  Moreover, a genuine and open 
inquiry into the legitimacy of any law founded on claims about knowledge 
should not take the legitimacy of intellectual property law for granted.  Let 
us not assume the robustness of the metaphoric castle and its associated 
domains.  Let us not assume that the justification for the intellectual 
property regime is so powerful at its top levels that the details of specific 
practices never need to be questioned.  Instead, postulating the absence of 
such a justification creates the first of the blank spaces to be explored.  
What happens when the system’s foundational premises are questioned and 
are questioned not merely in the mundane sense that some party believes 
that enforcement of an intellectual property right does not serve 
constitutional “Progress”?  What happens when challenges to the system’s 
authority arise from ground-level departures from the knowledge-related 
assumptions on which the entire argument is based?  What happens in a 
broad sense when the legitimacy and authority of knowledge itself are 
questioned in the narrow case, in which the parties and interests that are 
usually mediated by licenses are not necessarily the things being mediated 
in a particular case, or with a particular form?  Knowledge itself may not be 
what it appears to be, or to come from what (or where) we believe it comes 
 
 28. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND, at xii (2008) (“I do not write this as an enemy of intellectual property, a dot-
communist ready to end all property rights; in fact, I am a fan.  It is precisely because I am a 
fan that I am so alarmed about the direction we are taking.”). 
 29. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (confirming the Court’s deference 
to congressional judgment regarding the constitutionality of copyright legislation, so long as 
the “traditional contours of copyright protection” are respected).  The legal standard for 
recognizing a copyright in a creative work is astonishingly low, all but precluding 
meaningful review of “Progress” in the context of a particular work.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has recently suggested some modest limits on patentable subject matter, inspired by 
the constitutional mandate regarding “Progress.” See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 
398 (2007) (rejecting exclusive use of the “‘teaching, suggestion, motivation’” test for 
assessing obviousness under § 103 of the Patent Act). 
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from.  In some modern contexts, nothing is upstream and downstream in 
conventional terms, or parties are upstream and downstream 
simultaneously.  Other, unexpected continuities and discontinuities may 
appear. 
B.  Landmarks 
To make this concrete and to illustrate how these questions might be 
elaborated and a set of possible responses might be mapped, I begin with 
some landmarks.  Conceptual borderlands should be described in cognitive 
terms, according to what is salient or otherwise significant in human 
experience.30 
Some landmarks come from salient anecdotes concerning licenses and 
related forms that sometimes suffer on grounds of questionable legitimacy.  
Software licenses have long perplexed legal scholars because they do not 
track commercial practices associated with more conventional knowledge 
products, such as books.31  Copies of computer programs are “licensed,” 
though copies of books are sold.  Not all software licenses look or work the 
same way.  “Proprietary” licenses that shield computer code from popular 
access and “open” or open source licenses that mandate the disclosure of 
computer code are troubling for related but distinct reasons.32  Creative 
Commons licenses create conditions on the use of copyrighted material that 
try to ensure that later uses by later users are not impaired.33 
Restrictive licenses marry the license concept to tangible chattels, a move 
that triggers skepticism in most observers but that may be difficult to 
distinguish from software licenses if the “chattel” is wholly or partly 
electronic.  “One time use” or limited-use licenses and products take a 
number of modern forms, including single-use cameras developed by 
Fuji,34 Lexmark’s nonrefillable ink cartridges for computer printers,35 
 
 30. Cf. KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY 46–49 (1960) (describing the concept of 
imageability, or cognitive salience, in studies of citizen perceptions of urban geography). 
 31. See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware:  Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1035–48 (1998) (contrasting cultural understandings that 
surround books with emerging understandings for digital content).  There are reasons for the 
difference, though it is not clear whether those reasons are adequate as descriptions or as 
justifications of the phenomenon. 
 32. See David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 241 (offering the first and, perhaps still, the best account of the legal puzzles 
introduced by open source licenses). 
 33. See Creative Commons, About, http://creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 
23, 2009). 
 34. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(reversing judgment of patent infringement against remanufacturers of single-use film 
cameras). 
 35. See Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (finding that single-use restriction on printer cartridges did not violate California 
unfair competition law). 
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sterile seeds marketed by Monsanto,36 and single-use medical devices that 
must be thrown away. 
Restrictive notices have a long historical pedigree.  They prompted 
litigation in the nineteenth century by a producer of buckles for bale ties on 
nineteenth-century cotton37 and appeared on motion picture projection 
equipment in the early twentieth century.38  They were used on early 
prerecorded vinyl records39 and on videocassettes and DVDs nearly one 
hundred years later.40 
The doctrinal puzzles here bedevil lawyers and judges.  No unambiguous 
rule regarding the validity of use restrictions has emerged, though it is 
likely fair to say that the law takes a dim view of manufacturers’ imposing 
unilateral use restrictions on the use of things that they sell outright.  More 
important, however, these anecdotes expose some underexplored 
conceptual territory.  Are these conventional copyright and patent licensing 
practices writ into novel technologies?  Are these objects that have been 
bought and sold and shared subject to terms and conditions, as objects have 
circulated for centuries?  Do they present old problems, new problems, or 
changed conditions that expose gaps in our existing understandings?  If the 
licenses are mediating different constructions of knowledge, what are they 
mediating, and how? 
A second set of landmarks, prompting related questions, comes from 
recent cases.  Knowledge licensing can take almost any form:  transactions 
grounded in patent, copyright, trademark, or the law of trade secrets or 
know-how; permissions and restrictions relating to the use and disposition 
of material things and places; and rules regarding proper and improper use 
of knowledge that we think of as inherently public, such as ideas and 
information about the world.  These landmarks constitute a snapshot of 
recent cases featuring American courts dealing directly with licenses and 
indirectly with questions about the shapes of knowledge.  The first case 
involves patent law and the doctrine of exhaustion of patent rights.  The rest 
are copyright cases, involving a proprietary license, an open source license, 
 
 36. See Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules:  Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological 
“Lock-Out” Systems, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1553 (2004) (describing the legal implications of 
“self-policing” seed technology). 
 37. See Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882); Am. Cotton-Tie Supply 
Co. v. Bullard, 1 F. Cas. 625 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 294) (reviewing cases and granting 
injunction); Madison, Things, supra note 15, at 430–31. 
 38. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) 
(invalidating the license restriction as beyond the scope of the patent grant). 
 39. See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.) (refusing to 
enforce a legend reading “Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast” that appeared on phonograph 
records). 
 40. To quote legends from two objects that I picked off my shelf at home:  “This 
videocassette is for private home viewing only.  It is not licensed for any other use.” GOOD 
WILL HUNTING (Miramax 1997) (VHS videocassette).  “Licensed for private viewing only.  
Any other use prohibited.” IRON MAN (Paramount Pictures 2008) (Bluray).  In each example, 
and as with the legend in RCA Manufacturing v. Whiteman, the positioning and size of the 
legend make it all but impossible for any user of the object to see or read the text in the 
course of ordinary use of the film. 
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restrictive notices, and in one case a transaction with no express license or 
notice at all.  Several of them deal with software or other digital content, 
others with manufacturing licenses or the equivalent.  The cases deal 
initially with intersections between “proprietary” and “open” knowledge 
and often with the presumption that there is dominant “commercial” 
innovation and servient “other social systems” of innovation. 
As with the anecdotal landmarks above, they open up a set of questions 
that are more conceptually challenging than the doctrinal conflicts that they 
expose.  What is dominant and what is servient, for example, is less clear 
than we may think.  This snapshot highlights some important topics but 
does not capture all of them, and the resolution of these cases should be 
understood as illustrative, not determinative or exhaustive. These are 
landmarks in the sense that they anchor the exploration to follow.  No case 
example is ever a perfect illustration of a single point.  Each one points in 
multiple directions.  Knowledge is embedded in broader institutional, 
metaphorical, and material contexts.  The rest of this section lays out the 
examples.  The next part explores a geography. 
1.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,41 LG Electronics, Inc. 
(LGE) licensed a portfolio of patents to Intel Corp. in an express, bilateral, 
negotiated agreement, for Intel’s use in connection with manufacturing and 
selling microprocessors and chipsets.  On the one hand, the license 
agreement authorized Intel to “‘make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer 
to sell, import or otherwise dispose of’ its own products practicing the LGE 
Patents.”42  On the other hand, the license specifically stated that no license 
“is granted by either party hereto . . . to any third party for the 
combination by a third party of Licensed Products of either party with 
items, components, or the like acquired . . . from sources other than a 
party hereto, or for the use, import, offer for sale or sale of such 
combination.”43  
Intel advised purchasers of its products 
that, while it had obtained a broad license “ensur[ing] that any Intel 
product that you purchase is licensed by LGE and thus does not infringe 
any patent held by LGE,” the license “does not extend, expressly or by 
implication, to any product that you make by combining an Intel product 
with any non-Intel product.”44 
Quanta Computer, Inc. purchased Intel products containing LGE’s 
patented technology and combined those products with other computer 
 
 41. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
 42. Id. at 2114 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 8, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-
937)). 
 43. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 8). 
 44. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 9, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937))  
(emphasis omitted). 
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components.  Via the combination, Quanta infringed LGE’s patents, 
because Quanta (according to LGE) did not have LGE’s permission to 
practice its patents.  LGE sued Quanta for patent infringement.  The case 
made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which addressed whether LGE’s 
patent rights were “exhausted.”  Did LGE’s patent claims fail to extend to 
Quanta’s actions, by the authorized sale of Intel products to Quanta?  The 
Court ruled that exhaustion applied and that Quanta did not infringe. 
The Court reached its conclusion in two steps.  First, “the Intel Products 
constitute[d] a material part of the patented invention and all but completely 
practice[d] the patent.”45  (The Court noted a subtle but crucial distinction.  
The Intel products used the LGE patents sufficiently that Intel was 
“practicing” the LGE patents, and the Intel products “substantially 
embodied” the LGE patents, but because the elements of the patent claims 
themselves were modestly broader than the Intel devices, Intel did not 
infringe LGE’s patents.46)  Quanta did not modify the Intel products in any 
way.  It only plugged the Intel products into other standard computer 
components, which it had to do in order to use the products at all.47  
Second, and critically, the terms of the license agreement between LGE and 
Intel did not change the presumption that sale of the Intel products to 
Quanta was authorized.  At LGE’s instruction, Intel had advised Quanta 
that the patent license from LGE did not extend to combinations of Intel 
products and non-Intel products.  The Court concluded that the instruction 
and the advice did not explicitly qualify Intel’s authority to sell products 
that embodied the patented invention.48  The result is a case that strongly 
endorses the concept of patent exhaustion in principle, yet finds it 
applicable on these facts only because of the details of the agreement 
between the patent owner and its licensee. 
2.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. 
In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,49 Timothy Vernor purchased legitimate 
copies of AutoCAD, a copyrighted computer program produced by 
Autodesk, Inc., at a garage sale.  He offered those copies for sale at the 
eBay auction website.  Autodesk objected to the sales on the ground that 
every copy of AutoCAD is subject to the standard Autodesk Software 
License Agreement included with that copy, which grants “a ‘nonexclusive, 
nontransferable license to use the enclosed program . . . according to the 
terms and conditions herein’”50 and includes a “prohibition on rent, lease, 
or transfer [of] all or part of the Software, Documentation, or any rights 
granted hereunder to any other person without Autodesk’s prior written 
 
 45. Id. at 2120. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (relying on United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942)). 
 48. Id. at 2121–22 (distinguishing Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec., 304 U.S. 
175, aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938)). 
 49. 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
 50. Id. at 1166. 
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consent.’”51  It was undisputed that the original transferee of Vernor’s 
copies had agreed to the license.  Vernor asked the trial court, the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Washington, to declare that he 
was lawfully entitled to resell his copies of AutoCAD under copyright’s 
“first sale” doctrine, which permits the sale of a lawfully acquired copy of a 
copyrighted work by the “owner” of that copy.52  The court had to decide 
whether Vernor was an “owner” within the meaning of copyright law, or 
whether he stood in the shoes of the original transferee and was merely a 
licensee under the terms of AutoCAD’s software license. 
The court concluded that the original AutoCAD transactions were sales, 
not licenses, because in substance, if not in form, the transferee was 
intended and allowed to retain permanent possession of its copies of the 
program.53  Retention of possession was inconsistent with a license, in the 
court’s view.  The court denied AutoCAD’s motion to dismiss the case and 
its alternative motion for summary judgment. 
3.  MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. 
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and its parent, Vivendi Games, Inc., own 
and operate the massively successful online computer game known as 
World of Warcraft, which involves game players competing against one 
another and advancing through various levels via the acquisition of virtual, 
digital assets.54  Playing World of Warcraft requires that the player install a 
Blizzard computer program on a client computer that is connected to the 
Internet.  In the process of installing that program and playing the game, the 
player must agree to an end user license agreement (EULA) with respect to 
the game software and to online terms of use with respect to the online 
World of Warcraft game environment.  To the extent relevant to the case, 
the EULA provides that each player is granted only a license to install and 
use the game software, that players are prohibited from “intercepting, 
emulating, or redirecting the proprietary components of the game” and from 
“modifying files that are part of the game,”55 and that players may not 
“mine” the game for assets.56 
In MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,57 MDY 
Industries, LLC, distributed a computer program called WowGlider, which 
may be installed on the player’s client computer as an add-on to the 
Blizzard software and which can be used to play World of Warcraft 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 53. See Vernor, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1170–71. 
 54. This description significantly understates the complexity of the game environment 
and the game itself, neither of which have much to do with the legal or knowledge issues 
involved. 
 55. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PXH-DGC, 2008 WL 
2757357, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008). 
 56. Id. at *6. 
 57.  2008 WL 2757357. 
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automatically on behalf of that player.  WowGlider enables the player to 
acquire assets rapidly (to “mine” assets) and advance more quickly to 
higher levels of play than would be possible via standard human game play. 
MDY asked the trial court, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona, to declare that distribution of its computer program did not violate 
Blizzard’s software copyrights.  Blizzard asked the court to find that 
distribution of WowGlider rendered MDY liable for vicarious and 
contributory copyright infringement by World of Warcraft users. 
The court agreed with Blizzard, giving full effect to the World of 
Warcraft license in almost precise proportion to the extent to which the 
court in Vernor (which the MDY court distinguished) did not.  In spirit if 
not in letter, the court gave credit to Blizzard’s suggestion that the EULA 
and terms of use restrictions were needed to ensure a “fair” gaming 
experience for all participants.  The court concluded that the agreed 
restrictions on mining the game for assets constituted part of the limitations 
on the license granted by Blizzard.58  When purchasers of WowGlider used 
that program to play World of Warcraft, they failed to comply with a 
condition of the license.  Use of WowGlider in itself did not infringe 
Blizzard’s copyright in the World of Warcraft game client, but when 
players failed to comply with a condition of authority to use the client 
program, they infringed Blizzard’s copyrights in that program.59  The court 
granted Blizzard’s motion for summary judgment against MDY with 
respect to Blizzard’s copyright infringement claims.60 
4.  Jacobsen v. Katzer 
Robert Jacobsen owns the copyright in a computer program called 
DecoderPro, part of a software project called the Java Model Railroad 
Interface (JMRI) that supports model railroading with programs that allow 
model railroaders to control trains and model railroad switches.  
DecoderPro was distributed on the Internet via the “Artistic License,” a 
version of an open source license that expressly authorizes others to copy, 
modify, and redistribute the program code, including its source code 
version, but that conditions such authorization on compliance with various 
requirements having to do with attribution of the code to its original authors 
and making any modifications publicly available, among other things.  
Matthew Katzer and his company, Kamind Associates, Inc., incorporated 
some of the DecoderPro software in their competing product but failed to 
comply with all of the terms of the Artistic License.  Jacobsen sued Katzer 
for copyright infringement. 
 
 58. Id. at *5–6. 
 59. Id. at *6. 
 60. Following a later bench trial, the court entered judgment against MDY not only on 
Blizzard’s copyright infringement claims but also on related tort claims and claims under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-
06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 223631 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2009). 
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The question before the trial court in the case, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California, was whether the terms of the Artistic 
License offered a basis for copyright liability or only supported possible 
claims for breach of contract—the difference being the remedy to which 
Jacobsen would be entitled.  A successful copyright claim likely would 
support an injunction against Katzer.  A successful contract claim likely 
would support only a claim for money damages.  The trial court ruled that 
Jacobsen was entitled to relief in contract, not in copyright, and it denied 
Jacobsen’s request for a preliminary injunction.61 
In Jacobsen v. Katzer,62 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, disagreeing with the district court, vacated that ruling and 
concluded that Jacobsen’s claims sounded in copyright.63  It reasoned partly 
that the language of the license suggested the presence of a condition rather 
than a covenant, partly that any copyright owner (Jacobsen, here) retains the 
exclusive right to authorize modification and distribution of the work by 
others, and primarily that the conditional nature of the license was 
necessary to further the collaborative structure and the goals of the 
underlying open source software development project, the JMRI.64  The 
JMRI project, like any open source project, involves collaboration among a 
number of loosely affiliated programmers and users.  Formally, both 
Jacobsen and the court could have easily located an enforceable contract 
governing those users, by formatting the Artistic License in a way that 
deemed use of the DecoderPro license to constitute acceptance of the 
license.65  But a contractual damages remedy would be insufficient to 
compel ongoing cooperation with the development project, because a 
damages remedy might not induce a change in behavior by a noncompliant 
user of the software.  And since many open source programs are distributed 
for free, no damages for breach would be available in the first place.66 
5.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto 
UMG Recordings, Inc., a music recording and distribution company, 
distributed “promotional CDs” containing copyrighted music in various 
 
 61. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905 JSW, 2007 WL 2358628 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
17, 2007), vacated 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 62.  535 F.3d 1373.  
 63. Id. at 1381–82. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See McGowan, supra note 32, at 245 (semiseriously characterizing open source 
licenses as property-esque covenants that run with the code); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk 
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:  Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1312–13 (1998) (similarly describing running covenants, but in 
contractual terms). 
 66. On remand from the court of appeals, Jacobsen renewed his request for a preliminary 
injunction on both contract and copyright grounds.  Again, the district court denied 
Jacobsen’s motion, this time on the ground that he had produced insufficient evidence of 
harm. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1441 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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advertising and promotional contexts.  Those CDs were labeled with notices 
generally in the following form: 
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the 
intended recipient for personal use only.  Acceptance of this CD shall 
constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license.  Resale 
or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable under 
federal and state laws.67 
Troy Augusto bought these promotional CDs at record stores and through 
online auctions, then he sought to resell them through eBay.  UMG sued 
him for copyright infringement.  Augusto claimed a defense under 
copyright’s first sale doctrine.  The trial court, the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California agreed with him. 
 In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,68 as in Vernor, the question was 
whether Augusto was an “owner” of the CDs for statutory purposes.  Here, 
the court answered that question by analyzing the formal issue of title as 
between UMG and the initial recipients of the CDs.69  The only notice 
asserting that these transactions constituted licenses was on the CDs 
themselves.  UMG claimed that “acceptance” of the CD somehow 
constituted assent to that notice and that the parties were bound to an 
agreement.  The court disagreed.  It noted that it should focus on the 
“economic realities” of the transaction in determining whether title passed 
to the CD recipients.70  The court concluded that UMG did not intend that 
the recipients of the CDs would return them, and that the recipients did not 
expect to return them.71  The court in Augusto went further than the court 
did in a similar situation in Vernor, pointing out that the recipients had no 
ongoing duties to UMG and that UMG would derive no ongoing benefit 
from the recipients’ use of the CDs (other than benefiting from the 
allegedly anticompetitive impact of enforcing the restrictive notice).72  The 
court noted that music, unlike computer programs, is not customarily 
licensed by its distributors and does not ordinarily need to be reproduced in 
order to be enjoyed.73  In other words, consumer enjoyment of music does 
not usually trip one of copyright’s infringement wires, so there was no 
reason to interpret the restrictive notice as allocating title inconsistently 
with that usual expectation. 
 
 67. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2008); cf. 
supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text (describing the long history of restrictive notices 
on music and video media). 
 68.  558 F. Supp. 2d 1055. 
 69. Id. at 1059. 
 70. Id. at 1060. 
 71. Id. at 1061. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1060–62. 
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6.  Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon 
As an independent contractor, Kevin Gagnon developed and delivered 
code for several custom computer programs for Asset Marketing Systems, 
Inc. (AMS) under a series of express contracts governing the scope and 
term of Gagnon’s work and his compensation.  As to proprietary rights in 
the computer programs, the parties exchanged draft agreements but never 
signed a final version.  After AMS terminated Gagnon’s services, he 
demanded that AMS cease using the programs and return the code to him.  
When AMS refused, Gagnon sued AMS for copyright infringement. 
In Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon,74 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AMS and 
concluded that Gagnon granted AMS an irrevocable, unlimited, 
nonexclusive implied license to use the computer programs that Gagnon 
created.75  Applying the standard for implied licensing it set out in Effects 
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen,76 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the programs 
were created at AMS’s request and were delivered to AMS without 
restriction or limitation.  The court also noted that, in other respects, 
Gagnon’s conduct, considered “objectively,” manifested an intent to grant 
an implied license to AMS.77  The court did not pause to wonder whether 
AMS was the beneficiary of a transfer of ownership in the programs.  In 
that case, the first sale doctrine would not apply (first sale operates as a 
defense to certain claims of copyright infringement), but parallel reasoning 
might suggest that the parties did not intend that AMS’s ordinary 
continuing use of the programs would have any copyright law 
implications.78 
*   *   * 
The analytic value of these landmarks lies primarily in helping me get 
my bearings.  In Part III, I extend and generalize what they might tell us 
about a geography of knowledge, and specifically what they might tell us 
about the characteristics of knowledge that help us to understand its 
legitimacy and authority:  what is licensed and what can be; what cannot be 
licensed and why not; and the spaces at the borders and in between these 
domains, where we not only do not know all the answers but also have only 
begun to ask the questions.  In the Conclusion, I draw some broader 
 
 74.  542 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 75. Id. at 757. 
 76. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 77. Asset Marketing, 542 F.3d at 756–57. 
 78. The difference, if there is one, is entirely formal.  Use of the computer program 
involves “reproducing” the program in a technical sense.  It may or may not involve 
“reproduction” in a legally significant sense, though most courts have agreed that it does.  
Ordinary use of a book or a vinyl record album does not involve reproduction of any kind. 
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conclusions about the relationships among knowledge, legitimacy, and 
authority and about where a geography might take us. 
III.  THE BLANK SPACES ON THE MAP 
The fact that these cases signify landmarks does not necessarily tell us 
what those landmarks are, what they mean, or where they are situated in a 
prospective geography of knowledge.  To a practicing lawyer, they are 
landmarks of a very ordinary sort.  They have right and wrong results.  
They use rules and make rulings that are and are not consistent with 
precedent, with each other, with custom and commercial practice, and/or 
with common sense.  In specific doctrinal and policy senses, do they come 
to right and good outcomes? 
Quanta is right, I think, to endorse a strong principle of patent 
exhaustion.  But the Supreme Court’s analysis reflects the almost 
insuperable challenge of maintaining a consistent distinction between rights 
in objects that embody patented inventions and rights in the intangible 
invention itself.  Maintaining that distinction is a major goal of the 
exhaustion doctrine and an important part of the conceptual foundation of 
patent law.  Yet commercial practice and common sense demand the 
conclusion, also endorsed by Quanta, that contract law can still take a sale 
of a patented item out of the domain of exhaustion. 
Vernor and Augusto come to the right results and MDY does not in their 
treatments of formal limitations on consumer interests in products 
distributed to consumers and end-users.  But all three cases stand on some 
shaky reasoning in that they locate the idea of a “sale” of an item in 
contested understandings of what a “sale” means in social context.  Social 
context cannot be irrelevant to the meaning of a commercial transaction; 
making a legal sale stand solely on the formality of title or solely on the 
intent of the seller or licensor would undermine vast swaths of consumer 
protection law and would run contrary to much commercial law. 
Jacobsen and Asset Marketing are largely correct, given current 
copyright doctrine and standard understandings of copyright policy.  A 
collective commons of the sort that open source licenses enable cannot be 
effectively managed via interlocking contracts.  The copyright owner’s 
intent should be given major weight in constructing the character of a 
commercial transaction. 
That lightning quick review of the cases suggests that there are no sharp 
or easy lines to draw here.  My sense of the correctness and incorrectness of 
the different cases depends on situating myself somewhat hesitantly in the 
geography of knowledge that forms the balance of this essay.  Even 
doctrinally, conflict and contradiction in the cases is apparent immediately.  
Intellectual property interests can be licensed via contracts (Quanta), but 
similar licenses can be enforced as property rights instead (Jacobsen).  The 
intent of the owner of the legal right is sometimes determinative of the 
meaning of a transaction involving that right (Asset Marketing), but 
sometimes the understanding of those on the receiving end controls, rather 
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than the belief of those on the giving or selling end (Vernor, Augusto).  
Elsewhere, I suggest that some difficulties here could be resolved via 
greater reliance on the idea of salience of relevant claims, interests, and 
remedies, especially at the time of transacting, but that framework is 
necessarily general.79  Here, the right answer may be that law and policy 
should live with some unresolved tensions.80 
The more interesting and useful landmarks here are not doctrinal or 
practical.  They are conceptual.  What these cases suggest is the vast 
heterogeneity of the knowledge landscape as such, and the heterogeneity of 
the mechanisms by which law recognizes the value of knowledge.  The 
point of the landmarks is that the legal system recognizes knowledge 
simultaneously in objects and in practices.  Copyrights, patents, 
copyrightable “works of authorship,” books, computer programs, ideas, 
patents, and patentable inventions are all examples of knowledge objects.  
Objects overlap in various ways with knowledge practices and institutions, 
including, though hardly limited to, law.  Objects come in many different 
forms, and both law and other cultural practices allow us to combine those 
forms, to divide them, and to represent a single form in multiple objects.  
Knowledge may arise in origins and sources, but it may be understood only 
or largely by the practices of recipients, interpreters, and users.  Knowledge 
practices and institutions include conventions of using, transferring, storing, 
sharing, and consuming objects.  They include markets, custom, tradition, 
and innovation, among other ways of doing things.  Copyright and patent 
law are two of these.  Licenses and sales are two more, as are scientific 
research, university technology transfer, novels, and films.  There are 
knowledge collectives and knowledge-producing and knowledge-
consuming individuals, some of whom make knowledge their business 
(professional software developers such as Gagnon and intermediaries such 
as Vernor, Augusto, and Intel) and some of whom are knowledge hobbyists, 
such as the model railroading programmers in Jacobsen and the game 
players in MDY. 
It is possible to imagine a geography of knowledge that does not feature 
objects and institutions or practices prominently, but it is difficult.  Bearing 
that caution in mind, where the landmarks leave off and the borderlands 
begin has much to do with when and how knowledge objects are created 
and recognized (or changed, otherwise manipulated, or ignored outright); 
when and how various knowledge institutions and practices emerge, are 
formalized and sanctioned, evolve and disappear; and how examining those 
broad sets of questions leads to and follows from questions about overlaps 
and intersections between them.  The existence of copyright and patent law 
and the existence of licensing practices teach us that these are 
jurisprudential questions as well as questions of cultural theory and 
 
 79. See Madison, The Software License, supra note 15, at 338–39; Michael J. Madison, 
Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433, 485–91 (2003). 
 80. See Madison, supra note 1, at 159–74 (suggesting that institutional complexity in 
intellectual property law may be normatively attractive). 
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philosophy.  Object and institution do not mesh mechanically or on their 
own.  The legal system creates them, recognizes them, and validates them, 
connecting legitimate knowledge and legitimate law.81  These connections 
form knowledge maps, which, like other kinds of maps, may fold up neatly 
but which may also fold back on themselves, sometimes in unpredictable 
ways.82 
One way to take off from these landmarks and to make sense of the rest 
of the knowledge cases is to systematize the issues they raise in a set of 
dichotomies about law and knowledge:  contract and property interests; 
hierarchical and distributed social forms; open and closed systems; static 
and dynamic welfare; expert and amateur skill; culture and commerce; and 
individual and social agency.  To the extent that any of these approaches 
purports to offer a comprehensive understanding of knowledge issues, it is 
probably mistaken.  Each of these things inhabit overlapping spaces, in 
constant tension with one another. 
Moreover, how legitimate law relates to legitimate knowledge is often 
clearly marked and purposive, but it need not be.  Behind law’s 
representations of legitimate and authoritative knowledge lie intuitions, 
arguments, and beliefs regarding the value of knowledge and its objects and 
its institutions and its practices.  The Supreme Court in Quanta makes and 
relies on a statement about the value of patent exhaustion (that it is a good 
and broad doctrine).  The courts in Vernor and Augusto make and rely on 
statements about the value of consumer expectations (that they need to be 
protected, even in copyright law).  The court in Jacobsen makes and relies 
on a statement about open source software communities (that they can 
create valuable products).  Propositions about the law of knowledge connect 
in a variety of ways to various value-laden dimensions of knowledge. 
In geographic terms, core borderlands questions involve what is 
knowledge, what is the authority by which knowledge comes to be 
recognized as legitimate and by which knowledge exercises authority 
through law, and the why, where, and when of each of those questions, and 
in answering those questions, dichotomies will not do particularly well.  To 
focus on one specific example, what is the relationship between the 
knowledge community that is an open source computer software 
development project, and the knowledge artifacts that are the program itself 
(a dynamic, evolving thing) and the instrument that is the open source 
software license (typically, a fixed, static thing)?  What is the relationship 
between that combined enterprise and a similarly constructed but 
individually controlled and managed enterprise that produces and supports a 
 
 81. See Madison, Things, supra note 15. 
 82. Cf. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY:  OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF 
STRUCTURATION 162 (1984) (describing structuration, the constitution of human society, as a 
recursive relationship between human agents and constructed social practices).  The 
geographic metaphor has its limits, among them the presumption that the scope of the 
geography is limited.  The metaphoric associations of a cosmology of knowledge are more 
open-ended, but that metaphor is not otherwise particularly evocative. 
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conventional proprietary, closed-source computer program that competes 
with the open source version?  How does that proprietary program construct 
differ from the open source construct?  Does it matter if the open source 
version is based on the proprietary version, or the reverse, in some 
technological sense, or if some individual programmers have somehow 
participated in both?  And why and when should law, society, or public 
policy care?83  It is tempting to suppose that I might literally draw a map to 
serve as a guide to these questions, but instead, and without focusing 
exhaustively or exclusively on this particular set of questions, I explore 
several related open-ended and intentionally incommensurate borderlands 
issues.  These are keyed mostly to the cases highlighted in Part II, and they 
suggest that more exploration is needed before a map is possible, if it is 
ever possible. 
A.  Borderlands 
1.  Formalism 
Consistent with my interest in forms of legal practice, I start with 
intellectual structure and modes of formal legal reasoning.  Most lawyers, 
most courts, and many legal scholars examine knowledge licensing in one 
or more conventional modes of analysis.  The legitimacy and authority of 
knowledge depends on it being encoded in forms that the law or other 
cultural practice has come to recognize.  Licensing typically begins with an 
existing patent or copyright.  The right-owner grants permission to use that 
right to some other party (a user, consumer, manufacturing partner, and so 
on).  The validity and effect of the license begin with questions about the 
scope of the intellectual property interest (typically represented as a species 
of property right, to be controlled by the property owner within the limits 
provided by the relevant statute) and end with questions about the scope of 
the license grant.  Licensing exists precisely at intersections among the 
forms of things in the world and the formal analysis of language. 
One of these intersections is contract law, because most licenses of 
intellectual property rights are bound up with reciprocal promises to pay 
royalties or other fees.  Was a valid agreement formed?  What did each 
party promise to do?  What is the consequence of nonperformance?  
License agreements, which depend on each party’s assent, may be 
distinguished formally from restrictive notices, which do not.  Because a 
contract right is authoritative only between the parties but a property right is 
good against the world, as the legal saying goes, society may be less 
suspicious of the former than the latter.  So long as some assent-based 
mechanism is in place to ensure that all affected parties “agree” to the 
restriction, then the law treats the license as presumptively legitimate.  In 
 
 83. On the cultural dimensions of these questions, see CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO 
BITS:  THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE (2008). 
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the absence of assent, it is not.  That distinction places an obvious burden 
on legitimate assent mechanisms.84 
Such restrictive notices may be problematic in contract terms, but the 
same forms may be less troublesome if they are located at a second 
intersection, property.  Once a property right is given, then the fact that the 
owner chooses to dispose of all of it or part of it, is likely viewed as 
presumptively acceptable.  The trouble with property arises with the 
premise.  When is the property right legitimately given, and what is the 
scope of the right?  Because of their potential breadth, property rights are 
harder to come by and usually arise in forms specified by statute or through 
long acceptance in the common law.85  Copyrights and patents are 
themselves evidence of the power of property forms and how the law uses 
them to construct legitimate and authoritative knowledge objects. 
In the licensing context, at times, as in Jacobsen, the distinction between 
interpreting the legal form as a property right or as a contract right is 
significant, primarily because the different characterizations lead to 
different remedial outcomes.  (At times, the two remedies are cumulative 
rather than alternative.  The doctrine of preemption in federal law embodies 
the idea that federal intellectual property rights take precedence over 
contract and related state law rights in the event that they overlap.)  In 
Augusto, the court began with a formal inquiry into transfer of title between 
the CD producer and the initial CD acquirer.  In Quanta, the outcome of the 
case turned on the phrasing of the contract between LGE and Intel.  In Asset 
Marketing, the parties had a series of complicated dealings with one another 
that they never managed to record fully in a standard legal form.  But form 
it must be; the court shoehorned the arrangement into an alternative. 
The power of form can be overstated.  Ambiguities in the authority of 
formalism in knowledge law mirror ambiguities in the authority of 
formalism in knowledge itself.  Tangible knowledge objects come in 
recognized forms:  the book; the photograph; the CD.  The authority of the 
“original” copy may differ from the authority of reproductions.86  
Knowledge practices and institutions come in recognized forms:  the firm; 
the university; the newspaper; the encyclopedia.  All of these forms can be 
manipulated in various ways (lawyers and nonlawyers alike know this all 
too well), and knowledge frequently fails to come in or fails to yield easily 
to standard formal packages.  If a book is not published as paper and 
binding, is it still a book?  Perhaps, but the presence or absence of form 
alone is not enough to justify an answer.  Both the doctrine of exhaustion in 
 
 84. See Madison, supra note 79, at 447–64, 494–96. 
 85. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (explaining the limited 
forms of common-law property estates by analogy to the numerus clausus principle of the 
civil law). 
 86. See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 
reprinted in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968), on the 
authority of photographs and enhanced anxiety over originality in an era of cheap and exact 
reproductions. 
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patent law and the doctrine of first sale in copyright law depend on transfers 
of ownership, but “ownership” is neither defined in the relevant law nor 
readily susceptible to formal definition.87  For licenses, if a knowledge 
producer can manage to create a contract with every other party in the 
world, or if “assent” is treated too formally by courts and lawyers rather 
than as an inquiry into meaningful agreement, then the contract right is 
tantamount to a property claim.  Textual arguments become arguments 
about objects themselves. 
The deeper problem is that why form should be authoritative, either in 
law or in knowledge objects and practice, is often left unclear.  Form might 
be authoritative because people know about the form, perhaps can see the 
form, and can experience the form.  Or, form might be authoritative for 
reasons unrelated to direct experience.  Formalism might derive from other 
social structures or social needs, such as history, tradition, and custom, or 
social welfare claims, such as economic efficiency.  A patent can be 
authoritative whether or not consumers or users of a patented device can see 
evidence of a patent claim or evidence of its inventiveness.  Giving notice 
of the patent claim by marking the object with a patent number enhances 
the patent owner’s rights against would-be infringers.  But why should the 
patent itself assume and exercise such powerful properties?  What should 
the law do with a license that claims control of a knowledge object in the 
absence of a relevant copyright or patent? 
In that context, consider the possibility that form alone could determine 
what is a “knowledge object,” to which special rules might apply, and what 
is an ordinary object, subject to different rules.88  Fuji and Kodak 
manufacture “single use” or “one time use” cameras.  A remanufacturer 
collects the housings from “used” cameras, fills them with film, and sells 
the “single use” cameras for second uses.  Can Fuji or Kodak legitimately 
stop the remanufacturer’s activity?  Formal doctrine suggests that, if the 
original cameras are covered by a patent, then the remanufacturer is acting 
legally if it is “repairing” the cameras but illegally if it is making “new” 
cameras.89  The camera itself exercises the authority of the patent.  A 
camera is a kind of knowledge object, in the sense that it encodes various 
forms of knowledge.  If the original cameras are not covered by a patent, 
then the remanufacturer can act as it pleases.  It makes no difference 
whether the camera itself is labeled “single use camera” or is marked with a 
“single use only” legend or license.  The underlying logic and purpose of 
patent law control. 
 
 87. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) (granting the “owner” of a copy of a computer program 
certain rights to use that program). 
 88. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 101 
(2008) (describing the legal complexities of so-called “tethered” goods, or goods whose 
utility is inextricably linked to the utility of the platforms for which they are designed). 
 89. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(reversing judgment of patent infringement against remanufacturers of single-use film 
cameras). 
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Suppose instead that there is no patent, yet the camera is clearly and 
loudly packaged as a “One Time Use Camera” and the camera itself bears a 
notice that says, “Licensed for Single Use Only.”  The form of the 
knowledge (the nature of the object) appears to be unambiguous to the user, 
but the underlying logic and purpose of patents, which governed previously, 
are absent.  Courts that follow formal reasoning (and I suspect that most 
courts would in this example) ignore a distinction between repair and 
reconstruction and would permit a remanufacturer to collect, refill, and 
resell the housings.90 
Generalizing this example, the question is the weight to be given to the 
presence of the patent itself, as opposed to the form of the underlying 
knowledge object, or the form of something else (legal, tangible, or 
conceptual), or some other consideration entirely.  Consider property 
servitudes, the idea that a particular object carries with it a necessary and 
obligatory duty to use it in a certain way or not to use it in a certain way, so 
long as the recipient has notice of the limitation.  Such restrictions are 
common in the law of real property.  They are infrequent in the law of 
personal property, such as tangible objects (chattels).  Their treatment in the 
intangible knowledge context is complex.  Knowledge licenses restrict the 
use of knowledge objects and therefore get analogized to servitudes.91  
Augusto presented a kind of servitude in the “no resale” restriction on a CD.  
The court there focused on the physical object and found that the servitude 
could not be enforced.  An open source license, as in Jacobsen, presents a 
kind of servitude in placing a condition on use of the computer program.  
The court there focused on the intangible right and found that the servitude 
could be enforced.  As Zechariah Chafee noted, copyright and patent law 
are themselves types of servitudes, because they impose mandatory limits 
on what you can do with certain knowledge objects.92  Without being quite 
explicit on the matter, Chafee appeared to focus on the copyright-as-
servitude as attached neither to the physical object nor to the copyright, but 
rather to the intangible “work of authorship” that is embodied in the 
 
 90. Cameras are merely examples.  Comparable uncertainties regarding legitimacy and 
authority can be worked out for books (does copyright’s first sale doctrine apply to digital e-
books?), encyclopedias (should courts take judicial notice of the contents of Wikipedia 
entries?), newspapers (are the authors of blogs entitled to privileges arising under the First 
Amendment?), and even the firm (what are the liabilities of contributors to an open source 
collective for harms caused by the collective’s products?).  Answering each of these 
questions by relying on formal distinctions (an e-book is not a book; Wikipedia is not an 
encyclopedia; a blog is not a newspaper; an open source project is not a corporation) is 
plausible, but unsatisfying and incomplete. 
 91. For leading examples of this line of analysis, see generally Thomas M. S. Hemnes, 
Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software 
Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (1994); Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property 
Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New 
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008). 
 92. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 
967–68 (1928). 
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object.93  Other intellectual property law permits that kind of control only if 
the servitude is part of a voluntary arrangement.  Trade secrets and other 
legally recognized “ideas” can be controlled legally in the context of an 
agreement or a confidential relationship that is voluntarily assumed.94  If I 
buy a bottle of Coca-Cola, I have every legal right to try to unlock the 
secrets of its formula.  If I am a filmmaker and I receive an unsolicited idea 
submission in the mail that is marked “confidential,” I can make that film 
without fear of liability, in the absence of some undertaking to protect its 
confidentiality.  But private or unpublished knowledge can be controlled 
unilaterally by the producer or creator, without any prior commitment on 
the part of a recipient.  This material is not “property” in the first place.95 
The form of the servitude itself, in other words, does not offer much help 
in deciding whether the limitation is valid, entitled to legitimacy and 
authority validated by the legal system.  If knowledge licenses are common, 
and they are, does the frequency of the form itself grant them legitimacy 
and authority?  Or does the skeptical formalist argument take precedence?  
Are servitudes that expand the legitimate scope of copyrights and patents 
invalid?  Do servitudes that narrow them remain valid?96  Or is the 
distinction between servitude text and physical object an increasingly 
artificial one?  If so, then the formal authority of knowledge depends on 
other forms of authority,97 which might be itself form-based or formal (and 
then it is turtles all the way down, as Bertrand Russell might have said),98 
or which might be something else. 
2.  Functionalism 
The point is not that formalism is dead or irrelevant.  The point is that the 
territory occupied by formalism is also inhabited by other things.  The 
limits of formalism characteristically give way to one of the many flavors 
of functionalism.  Functionalist reasoning comes in many different forms, 
 
 93. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:  Implications 
for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998) (describing servitudes in copyright as 
allowing price discrimination on the “thing”—the chattel).  It may be more accurate to say 
that the servitude runs with the intangible legal object that the law calls a “work of 
authorship” or, in patent law, an “invention.”  On the development of the concept of the 
“work of authorship” in the nineteenth century as the locus of copyright analysis, see Oren 
Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited:  Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in 
Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008). 
 94. Related cases impose liability for misappropriation of trade secrets by “improper 
means.” See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(notoriously imposing liability for trade secret misappropriation on a photographer who flew 
over the plaintiff’s construction site in order to learn secrets of its manufacturing process).  
Still, even in those cases, there should be some salient, contextual notice to the would-be 
appropriator that the conduct is improper. 
 95. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890).  Wendy Gordon made this point to me. 
 96. See Van Houweling, supra note 91. 
 97. See Robinson, supra note 91. 
 98. The attribution of the phrase to Bertrand Russell comes from STEPHEN J. HAWKING, 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (1988). 
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from utilitarian consequentialist reasoning to forms of economic analysis 
that focus on allocative issues, to distributive justice arguments, to 
“economic realism,” to arguments based on social conventions and other 
patterns of social and cultural practice.99  Jacobsen suggests that open 
source software licenses should be enforced in a certain way because doing 
so enhances the success of the open source project, which is a project worth 
promoting.  MDY suggests that Blizzard’s EULA and terms of use should 
be enforced because enforcement maintains the fair competitive 
environment that all World of Warcraft users expect.  Augusto declares that 
reselling promotional CDs is lawful in part because music is not usually 
licensed to consumers.  Vernor declares the recipient of the software 
package is an “owner” in part because the parties expect that the program 
will never be returned to the producer. 
Reliance on the knowledge producer’s intent substitutes a type of 
purpose-based reasoning for form,100 as do appeals to transaction-cost 
reduction or to the overarching goals of the law.  “Balance” arguments in 
knowledge cases are the quintessential vessels of functionalism.  Copyright 
law was rewritten in 1976 largely to reframe the protection of creative 
things in terms of function (copyright now attaches automatically to 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression”101) rather than in terms of form (the 1909 statute permitted 
protection of books, periodicals, lectures, photographs, and so on102).  
Purposive arguments in the law have counterparts elsewhere in knowledge 
contexts.  Books, music, or genetic sequences are recognized as such 
because of their roles in social or cultural settings, or because of their 
explanatory power in scientific or historical contexts.  How to think about 
the Internet and related policy arguments (What to do about social media?  
About YouTube?  About net neutrality?) is a question that is almost always 
posed in functional terms. 
One limit of functionalism generally is that the value of any particular 
functionalist account depends largely on the merit of assumptions that the 
functionalist argument itself cannot justify.  Should society conceptualize 
knowledge questions in utilitarian terms?  In distributive justice terms?  
Certainly, if we agree that utilitarianism or some measure of distributive 
justice is the right baseline.  But functionalism alone cannot justify that 
answer.  How to manage the weight of functionalist accounts of authority 
and how to blend them with other arguments can only be resolved 
pragmatically on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 99. See Cohen, supra note 13. 
 100. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe:  Repair, Reconstruction, and the 
Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423 (1999) (arguing that the 
related doctrines of patent exhaustion and implied license can be reconciled by focusing on 
the intent of the patentee/seller/licensor). 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 102. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified in scattered sections 
of 17 U.S.C.). 
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If formalism described one borderland of knowledge and authority, 
functionalism occupies part of that territory and expands into a related but 
distinct conceptual space.  The legitimacy issue here is not simply the 
insufficiency of functionalism on its own terms, but the inability to fully 
articulate function at all.  We can articulate function in terms of form 
(copyright law and patent law are meant to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts), but that is an obvious circularity.  How do we assess 
the authority of a knowledge argument that addresses a form or practice that 
has no known definable value, or whose purpose can be defined and 
defended in some cases but not in all, or whose function is incompletely 
known?  From a functionalist perspective, how do we identify and assess 
the limits of our knowledge? 
Functionalist accounts of the Internet and its networked relatives, such as 
“social production,” to borrow Yochai Benkler’s phrase,103 have this partly 
circular, partly endlessly open character.  The Internet is a form of 
knowledge, a knowledge practice (and/or collection of many practices), and 
a knowledge tool (and/or many tools).  What is it good for?  How does the 
network function as a knowledge enterprise?  Both of the following 
statements are true:  Because of its speed, its breadth, and its depth, its 
potential for good appears to be almost limitless; we have only begun to 
understand its benefits.  Because of its speed, its breadth, and its depth, its 
potential for harm is almost equally limitless; we have only begun to see 
manifestations of its real costs.  In specific cases and contexts, those claims 
can be measured; value identified; harms assessed and mitigated or 
eliminated.  There is no overarching functional way to approach the 
authority of the network or the network of networks as such.  The best 
accounts, though still incomplete, rely on the “emergent” properties of 
complex systems.104  To the extent that we believe that we have found it, 
the explanation may turn out to be incomplete, or even wrong.  Lior 
Strahilevitz argues that the virtues of social production diminish as 
production capacity is reallocated.105  The wealth of networks, or one form 
(or collection of forms) of knowledge authority and legitimacy, depends on 
the wealth of people and of other institutions, which need their own sources 
of authority. 
Consider patenting of genetic sequences and regulation of genetically 
modified (GM) agricultural products.  In the United States, genes (or at 
least definable genetic sequences) can be patented, and GM foods are 
presently unregulated in the United States so long as the genetic 
 
 103. See BENKLER, supra note 2, at 117.  
 104. Susan Crawford, Shortness of Vision:  Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2005). 
 105. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472 (2007) 
(reviewing BENKLER, supra note 2) (questioning the implicit economics of Benkler’s Wealth 
of Networks on the ground that social production assumes excess productive capacity to 
begin with).  Yochai Benkler himself recognizes that social production as such carries little 
normative weight, which is why he devotes so much of his book to the argument that social 
production is consistent with a theory of justice. See BENKLER, supra note 2, passim. 
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engineering involved produces foods that are not tangibly different from 
foods produced using traditional breeding techniques.  The authority of the 
patent system and the regulatory position of the FDA are based on a 
functional understanding of the authority of the underlying science.  That 
functional authority is the so-called “Central Dogma” of molecular 
biology—that each gene carries information needed to construct one 
protein.  If the science is functionally incomplete, however, because a gene 
cannot be linked uniquely to a useful outcome, then the regulatory structure 
fails with it.106  Functionalism is not simply a technique for sanding the 
rough edges of formalism so that we can update and apply old arguments in 
new settings.  Functionalism exposes the limits of knowledge itself. 
3.  Materiality 
That conclusion carries with it an intentional ambiguity of a different 
sort.  To what extent do functional arguments, grounded in how the world 
works, assume understanding of concepts, and to what extent do they 
assume the operation of material forms?  Functionalism exposes a 
borderland occupied by concept and mechanics, but it also suggests how 
intellectual structure connects to material structure.  The authority of 
licensed knowledge forms called servitudes is based partly on formal 
distinctions among common, unproblematic servitudes on land; problematic 
licenses that govern tangible objects; questionable licenses that govern 
intangible knowledge-based “works” and “inventions”; and common, 
unproblematic licenses that govern intangible intellectual property rights 
themselves.  Their authority is distinctly but equally based on the tangibility 
of the knowledge object.  The authority and legitimacy of knowledge and of 
knowledge licenses depends on the materiality of knowledge objects.  Can 
you touch them; see or feel their edges; and share or hoard them?  The 
physicality of the object enhances the legitimacy of the knowledge object, 
and reinforces its unlicensable, indivisible identity.  For knowledge 
purposes, the integrity and authority of the book itself is paradigmatic.  
Shakespeare would not be “Shakespeare,” the forebear of Western 
literature, without the First Folio that collected his works and consolidated 
the author’s identity with the literature that he produced.107  Books can be 
sold and given away but, it is commonly assumed, cannot be licensed.108 
The authority of materiality presents some problems that are familiar to 
intellectual property lawyers.  Intellectual property rights touch and encode 
knowledge at three levels of authority and legitimacy at once:  the legal 
interest that we call the copyright or the patent; the intangible “work of 
 
 106. See Denise Caruso, A Challenge to Gene Theory, a Tougher Look at Biotech, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2007, at 3.  I owe this point to Katherine Van Tassel. 
 107. See, e.g., David Lloyd Kreeger, In re Shakespeare:  The Authorship of Shakespeare 
on Trial:  Preface, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 609 (1988) (summarizing a mock trial on the question 
of the identity of the author of the contents of the First Folio). 
 108. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (rejecting effort by copyright 
owner to enforce resale restriction printed in a copyrighted book). 
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authorship” that is copyrighted and the “invention” that is patented; and the 
physical thing that encodes the work of authorship (the “copy” in copyright 
jargon) or the invention.109  Even within the legal system, lawyers and 
judges frequently confuse or fail to distinguish among them.  The landmark 
licensing cases above maintain those distinctions only in a fragile sense.  
Augusto and Vernor treat the CD and the copy of the computer program 
themselves as the relevant knowledge objects.  MDY and Asset Marketing 
give greatest weight to the legally constructed thing, the creative work of 
authorship owned by Blizzard or produced and sold by Gagnon.  Quanta 
deals with the twilight that exists between a license that clearly dealt in 
LGE’s patent rights themselves, and the tangible object produced by Intel 
that somehow “embodied” the patented invention. 
Partly, there are historical ambiguities at work.  Copyright, for example, 
once treated the “copy” or “copie” as its object, the physical manuscript that 
was the author’s original product.  Over time, the author’s product was 
dematerialized.  Now the physical “copy” is excluded from the scope of 
copyright and the intangible “work” or “work of authorship” is regarded as 
the fruit of the author’s creative labors.  The authority of the copyright 
itself, therefore, inheres in something other than the material form of the 
product.  It is indisputably enhanced, however, when the copyright maps 
closely to a comprehensible physical form.  Partly, there are cognitive and 
administrative challenges.  A copyright in a novel covers the full text of the 
book, but it may also extend separately to its plot or even to a particular 
character.  It is not always easy for readers or for courts to identify what is 
copyrighted and what is not, or what is legally encoded knowledge and 
what is not.  Patent law solves this problem, at least formally, by 
demanding that inventors specify their inventions in written claims.  Partly, 
there is deliberate manipulation of the lines.  Licenses for computer 
programs are often written so as to assert copyright claims to the copy of 
the program itself, rather than to the work of authorship that exists 
independently of the copy.  Given these tangles and tensions, ordinary 
consumers, users, and readers (not to mention new authors, inventors, 
judges, and lawyers) should all be forgiven for our inability to process the 
metaphysics of what is intangible “work of authorship” and what is tangible 
“copy” in a knowledge form that is, by definition, composed of electrons. 
We have a variety of tools at hand to deal with these questions, but those 
tools are necessarily adequate only up to a point.  The law works 
aggressively to identify legal objects that substitute metaphorically for 
material things.  “Expression” in copyright is isolated from “idea”; “ideas” 
themselves are segregated and given a special status that does not quite 
correspond to colloquial, free speech, or literary understandings of the 
concept.  Patent law mandates that an invention be isolated in a “claim,” 
which gives the inventor’s product a legal existence that is related to but 
may be quite distinct from what the inventor in fact concocted.  To 
 
 109. See Madison, The Software License, supra note 15, at 279–80. 
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construct authoritative material structures around knowledge, we may turn 
to the physical settings in which we encounter knowledge objects (homes, 
schools, libraries, companies); the tools that we use to access and enjoy 
knowledge (computers, television monitors); and the conceptual apparatus 
that we supply (our prior experiences and learning, embodied in high school 
diplomas and college degrees). 
Searching the territory for arguments from formalism and function can 
help us sort these further.  Metaphor and experience are powerful mediators 
when we are trying to decide whether something “is” a book or a library, or 
whether something “is” an idea.110  We come against the limits of our usual 
capabilities, however, where and when the tangible and the intangible 
appear to be literally and metaphorically inextricable.  On the one hand, that 
combination gives a knowledge object an especially powerful form of 
authority.  A gene or genetic sequence usually falls into this category.  A 
patented gene is an authoritatively powerful form of knowledge, both 
technically and legally.  There is no negotiating with or avoiding a thing 
that works exactly as designed to control the storage, distribution, or use of 
knowledge, and that cannot be tinkered with or “hacked” to achieve some 
different result.111  The most powerful versions of these combinations are 
invisible to consumers and users, in the sense that their knowledge forms 
are essentially taken for granted and unchallengeable.  On the other hand, to 
the extent that some interest in extracting, recombining, or otherwise 
engaging with that knowledge is identified, figuring out a legitimate point 
of access for doing that is a genuine puzzle.  The most notorious of these 
things are seeds that employ Monsanto’s patented “Terminator” technology.  
Seeds that incorporate the Terminator gene produce harvestable crops, but 
seeds saved from those crops are sterile.  Farmers cannot save seeds, which 
would be a traditionally legitimate method of using seed-based knowledge, 
but instead must return to buy another load of seeds for a next generation 
crop. 
Some recent patent cases illustrate the problem in more subtle ways.  In 
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,112 Schering obtained a patent 
on the antihistamine loratidine (known popularly as Claritin), and later 
obtained a patent on a metabolite of loratidine (DCL), a chemical 
compound formed in the human body when it processes loratidine.113  
When Schering’s patent on loratidine expired, Geneva sought to market a 
generic version of the drug.114  Schering sued, alleging that Geneva was 
liable indirectly for infringement of the DCL patent by patients who 
 
 110. See George H. Taylor & Michael J. Madison, Metaphor, Objects, and Commodities, 
54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141 (2006) (initiating an account of information governance that relies 
explicitly, in part, on metaphor). 
 111. On technological affordances and prescriptions in the intellectual property context, 
see TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT:  COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE 
(2007). 
 112. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 113. Id. at 1375. 
 114. Id. at 1376. 
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ingested the generic loratidine and formed DCL in their stomachs.115  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that Schering’s 
DCL patent was invalid because the claims to DCL were anticipated by 
Schering’s loratidine patent by virtue of the doctrine of inherency.116  In lay 
terms, the DCL metabolite was necessarily covered by the earlier loratidine 
patent, even though it was not described in the loratidine patent, because 
human use of Claritin necessarily involves producing DCL.  The 
authoritative knowledge content of loratidine, a knowledge object, was 
deemed to include something that loratidine does not and could not include 
as a technological matter. 
A converse situation arose in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp.,117 another pharmaceutical case.  SmithKline Beecham patented the 
compound in the antidepressant drug known as Paxil.  SmithKline Beecham 
sued Apotex Corp., which intended to market a generic version of the drug, 
arguing that Apotex’s generic version would infringe SmithKline 
Beecham’s patent.  The problem arose because the manufacturing process 
used by Apotex, which produced a product that would not infringe, 
necessarily produced tiny amounts of a byproduct compound that would 
infringe.  On the facts of the case, it appeared that for reasons relating to the 
chemistry at issue, even a good faith effort to avoid infringing the patent 
could not succeed; the byproduct would necessarily and naturally be 
created.  The court invalidated SmithKline Beecham’s patent on public use 
grounds, which are not relevant to the discussion here.118  More interesting 
was the concurrence, which argued that the patent failed the subject matter 
threshold for patentability because the patent did not disclose a discrete, 
invented thing.119  Instead, the claim embraced a compound that was 
created naturally as a result of a chemical process.  The authority of the 
knowledge object (the patent) in this case should have a considerably 
narrower scope than its material embodiment would otherwise suggest (had 
SmithKline Beecham claimed patent protection of narrower scope, focusing 
only on the manufactured version of the compound, it would have been on 
safe ground).  The point, to be clear, is that the legitimacy of material 
authority is suspect when lines between the material object and the 
knowledge object—the patent, the license, the other representation of 
knowledge—cannot be readily disaggregated.  Even when we have analytic 
tools that allow us to do that, at times the material world does not 
accommodate them, at least not readily. 
 
 115. Id. at 1375–76. 
 116. Id. at 1382. 
 117. 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, reh’g granted, reh’g en banc denied, 403 
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1218  
(2006). 
 118. Id. at 1316–20. 
 119. Id. at 1321 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
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4.  Baselines 
The geography described partly by the authority of form, function, and 
materiality depends in part on its intersection with yet other authorities.  
Among them is what might be called the legitimacy of baselines, which 
takes on several different casts.  Distinguishing the legal form we call a 
license from the cultural form we call the knowledge object—a book, a CD, 
an LP, a computer program—requires some method for identifying what 
counts as a “book” or knowledge object in the first place, and for 
recognizing that, in some sense, the category can both evolve over time yet 
remain recognizably the same.  The baseline itself exercises a form of 
legitimate authority.  If something is a book, then certain legal, social, and 
cultural rights, interests, and consequences follow.  What are the baseline 
rights and interests in that context? 
Copyright law’s “new use” cases raise this question in different 
technological settings.  A copyright owner licenses the work of authorship 
for use in some format.  Technology and practice evolve, and the licensee 
claims that a new use, such as a videocassette version of a motion picture, is 
covered by a license grant that authorizes an old use.  Courts inevitably and 
necessarily resolve these debates by relying on assumptions about 
baselines, assumptions about the default shapes of both the knowledge 
objects (the “motion picture,” the “book”) and the exclusive rights that 
accompany those forms.120 
The landmark that looms largest over this territory is Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
v. Straus,121 the venerable Supreme Court opinion widely regarded as the 
first modern case on copyright’s first sale doctrine.  The Supreme Court 
examined a restrictive “license” printed in the frontispiece of a novel that 
recited:  “The price of this book at retail is One Dollar net.  No dealer is 
licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as 
an infringement of the copyright.”122  The restriction was held to be 
unenforceable, because the copyright owner’s statutory right to control sales 
of the book (to “vend” the book, as the statute provided at the time) did not 
extend to control of resales of the book.  The Court concluded, 
To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future 
retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, 
would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our 
view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when 
interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its 
enactment.123 
 
 120. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (concluding that a license to use a musical composition in “one motion picture” 
included use of the work in a motion picture distributed in video format). 
 121. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 122. Id. at 341. 
 123. Id. at 351. 
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While stated by the Court as a conclusion, the quotation merely restates 
the issue.  It is the nature of copyright in books, the Court essentially says, 
that renders the “license” restriction illegitimate.  It is possible to 
reconstruct that conclusion in functional terms (the “license” is inconsistent 
with various purposes of copyright law), but that justification founders 
ultimately on the limits of functionality as authority.  Neither Bobbs-Merrill 
nor the first sale principle for which it stands is illegitimate, but the limits of 
the authority of the case—grounded as it is on the presumed scope of the 
authority of the nature of the book itself—must be acknowledged.  As 
above, note again the overlapping character of the borderland issues.  
Textual arguments again become arguments about objects, but in a very 
different way. 
In Augusto (involving music media), Vernor (involving computer 
programs), and MDY (involving videogames and related programs), 
ownership is the baseline.  Could the court locate an owner?  If so (and how 
could the court do that?), what followed from ownership?  The courts in 
Augusto and Vernor located an owner.  The court in MDY did not.  The 
point here is not that each court was correct or that the decisions were 
uncontroversial.  The point is solely that the authority of the relevant license 
depends on authority grounded in the relevant conceptual and material 
starting points.  Equivalent baseline questions emerge from considering 
what knowledge can be or is covered by intellectual property rights, and 
what lies in the public domain. 
Baselines connected to books and board games are, for the most part, 
fairly uncontested.  Videogame baselines are not.  So, players of World of 
Warcraft, like readers of fantasy literature and players of board games, may 
expect that they are “entitled” to modify the play of the game as they see fit 
in the privacy of their bedrooms, dorm rooms, family rooms, or offices.  In 
some meaningful sense, artificially speeding up the play of the game is no 
different than agreeing with fellow Monopoly players to contribute “fines” 
to a pot in the center of the board, to be collected by the next player who 
lands on “Free Parking.”  That regime is common in Monopoly, but it does 
not appear in the printed rules that accompany the game.  It may be no 
different than playing a copyrighted Nintendo video game using an add-on 
Game Genie device that is not authorized by Nintendo.124  In MDY, the 
competitive baseline was different, prohibiting modification of the rules, 
partly because the players agreed to an EULA and terms of use that said 
that it was (note a formalist argument); partly because the nature of a 
massive multiplayer online game appeared to prohibit the kind of small-
scale coordination that makes the Monopoly modification possible (note the 
functionalist argument); partly because the game platform and its 
application intersected technically in a specific way designed by Blizzard 
(note the materialist argument); and partly because the World of Warcraft 
 
 124. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that use of the Game Genie device, which changed the player’s experience of 
copyrighted video games distributed by Nintendo, did not infringe Nintendo’s copyrights). 
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software and service were encumbered by copyrights that are broader in 
scope than the copyrights that apply to Nintendo’s videogame system or to 
the Monopoly board game.  The baseline is different.  Blizzard’s copyrights 
simply reached farther in the first place. 
Having identified some of the dimensions of the borderlands here, it is 
possible to start to bushwhack our way out of them.  For example, it is 
possible to imagine a state of affairs where the court might simply declare 
in a videogame case, as the Supreme Court did in Bobbs-Merrill (and as 
district courts did in Vernor and Augusto), that the copyright simply does 
not extend that far in the first place.125  But why?  What attributes of a 
massive multiplayer online game support one baseline rather than any 
other?  The question of licenses-as-servitudes suffers from the same flaw.  
Servitudes on certain chattels may be justified, and licenses-as-servitudes 
on computer programs in particular may be justified, because objects 
suffused with intellectual property rights are simply different.  Chafee, for 
instance, initially was not persuaded that chattels were so different from 
land in the first place that different rules regarding servitudes were 
appropriate, but he did make clear that chattels supported by intellectual 
property rights constituted a valid class of servitude-encumbered things.126  
Society has declared by statute that producers need intellectual property 
rights as incentives to produce and distribute these things, and licenses are 
appropriate accompaniments to the initial grant of rights.  Even if that 
equation does not add up in the case of tangible chattels, it might add up 
with regard to computer programs, whose reproducibility makes them 
especially susceptible to appropriation and as to which licenses seem 
especially justifiable.  Is the relevant baseline the world of land, where 
servitudes have long been accepted; ordinary chattels, where they have not 
been; or “intellectual property chattels,” where the analogy to land might be 
 
 125. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703–05 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(upholding enforcement of “one-time use” license restriction that accompanied sale of 
patented medical devices); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (rejecting software manufacturer’s attempt to enforce “educational use” 
restriction that accompanied transactions in copyrighted software); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One 
Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (enforcing “educational use” 
terms in a software case). Compare United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 
(1942) (invoking the doctrine of patent exhaustion on the ground that the defendant 
improperly proposed to extend its patent monopoly), with Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. 
Elec., 304 U.S. 175, aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (affirming judgment of patent 
infringement against purchaser who failed to acquire permission to exploit the patented 
invention when it acquired patented devices from a licensee). These are all in part baseline 
cases. 
 126. See Chafee, supra note 92, at 967–68.  Zechariah Chafee considers land to be the 
baseline.  He later argues that the complex marketing organization of a standardized article is 
roughly comparable to organizing and managing a restricted neighborhood, both in its 
function and in its legitimacy. Id. at 986.  The terminal point is disposition of the article in 
the hands of the ultimate consumer.  The restriction could be enforced against wholesalers 
and retailers and other intermediaries, but not against what today we call end-users. 
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stronger, or where the question is simply sui generis?127  How, precisely, 
should we frame the questions? 
5.  Rhetoric 
Our discomfort with allocating baseline status to knowledge forms and 
practices that do not fit neatly with existing categories and understandings 
is partly conceptual and partly material, but it is also partly rhetorical.  This 
is the borderlands of talking about knowledge, and the related problem of 
talking about the law of knowledge. 
The very idea of a baseline invokes metaphoric associations that are only 
partly useful in conversations about knowledge.  “Baseline” suggests that 
we have to start somewhere, when in fact it is equally plausible that 
understanding knowledge means understanding how to engage in a process 
or flow that has been underway for centuries.  The question of ownership 
that pervades the licensing cases follows rhetorically from the assumption 
that copyright begins as a form of propertized knowledge.  But as the notes 
above make clear, the concept of ownership eventually runs aground on the 
limitations of the conceptual and material justifications that it appears to 
rely on.  We are left at times with ownership and its associated vocabulary 
as rhetorical tools in themselves, without stable referents in material objects 
or social practices.  I do not mean to suggest that words dictate how we 
think or behave.  Form, function, materiality, and assumptions about the 
world—among other things—offer related and at times compelling 
justifications through law for both belief and action.  Instead, the point is 
that language, thought, and behavior reinforce and redirect one another as 
actions, speech, and experience intersect.  Cognitive linguists and their 
intellectual cousins in philosophy identify a multidimensional hinge for 
much of this:  metaphor.128  The authority and legitimacy of knowledge 
forms and practices in law coexists in a reciprocal relationship with how we 
frame and experience conversations about them.  Earlier, I suggested that 
the authority of language in law depends in part on the legitimacy of 
knowledge objects.  Here, the point is that the reverse may be true as well.  
The legitimacy of knowledge objects depends in part on the authority of 
language in law. 
In contemporary knowledge contexts, this relationship appears most 
commonly in connection with the question of knowledge as property.  
Copyright and patent are said to be species of property law, and statutory 
rights are analogized to common-law property rights to exclude and to 
exploit.  At several levels, the analogy is said to be highly imperfect.  
Infringement of copyright and patent rights, and their ethical cousin, 
plagiarism, are said to be tantamount to “theft” or “stealing” of ideas and 
 
 127. See Robinson, supra note 91, at 1523 (“The question pertinent to property servitudes 
is simply where to set the baseline on entitlements.”). 
 128. See generally Taylor & Madison, supra note 110. 
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knowledge,129 but the economically minded (the functionalists in the group) 
remind us that knowledge goods are “public goods” and therefore lack the 
rivalrousness of ordinary tangible property.130  Because of substantial 
differences in the harm inflicted, infringement of intangible knowledge 
rights does not equal theft of tangible things.  Control over one’s own 
knowledge is analogized to mythical Blackstonian dominion over an estate 
in land.  It is pointed out that the Blackstonian model was not as absolute as 
we imagine, and modern property rights are so full of limitations and 
exceptions that it scarcely makes sense to speak of property as “property” 
any longer, if it ever did. 
The to-and-fro continues theoretically.  Legal rights in knowledge are 
offered as solutions to a tragedy of the knowledge commons, by analogy to 
the classic metaphor positing that land-based property rights respond to a 
tragedy of the physical commons—the overgrazing that may result if too 
many people have undifferentiated access to a shared resource.  If all sheep 
owners allow their sheep to graze on the common but no one owns divisible 
rights in the common, then the common will be overgrazed, and no one will 
have a suitable incentive to improve it.  The commons metaphor may be 
entirely inapt in the knowledge context.  Or the tragedy of the commons 
may be an overused metaphor for property rights in general.  We might start 
instead, as I suggested above, with the premise that the absence of legal or 
social constraints on knowledge is the appropriate baseline, and that some 
kind of justice-based, unfair competition scheme might intrude but only at 
the margins.  We might argue that the entirety of the knowledge enterprise 
is constructed by human society out of a wide variety of material and 
rhetorical resources, neither starting nor stopping at any particular point, 
and that the object and subject of knowledge is to enable human flourishing 
not only by enabling the productive exploitation of resources, but also by 
minimizing or even eliminating the harm that exploitation causes.  The 
point of an open source license, as the court recognized in Jacobsen, is to 
preserve the continuity of the knowledge construct.  Creative Commons 
licenses try to do something similar.  Their point is to use the very tools of 
copyright doctrine, on which Creative Commons licenses depend, to 
minimize the economic and cultural harm that copyright can cause.131 
The borderland here is that the legitimacy of the functions being 
exercised by knowledge objects (copyrights and patents, intellectual 
property licenses, software programs, knowledge collectives) depends in 
part on the authority of the rhetorical resources deployed to support them.  
Some advocates exalt expanding the “public domain” defined by copyright 
and patent law, but we do not know what the world of knowledge would 
 
 129. See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004) 
(distinguishing the rhetoric of stealing from the issues created by peer-to-peer file sharing). 
 130. See Lemley, supra note 4. 
 131. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works:  
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 271 (2007). 
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look like or even sound like if the intellectual property and phenomenal 
baselines were changed, and if the conceptual and rhetorical categories that 
we have inherited were reorganized.132  Consider Google, whose interests 
and potential liabilities are the subjects of a growing literature and whose 
status as an authoritative and legitimate knowledge producer and collector 
is contested, to say the least.  We might characterize Google as the governor 
of a kind of new public-private “commons,”133 or as a new “intermediary” 
to be analogized to older intermediaries, such as publishers,134 or as a 
species of “search,” a sui generis conceptual and legal category.135  We do 
not really know, in other words, precisely what copyright and patent 
categories contribute to our understanding of what things count as 
knowledge and what things do not. 
Throughout this essay I have unified a number of different legal forms, 
arguments, and themes under a common heading that I label “licensing,” 
but it would be plausible to differentiate them and analyze them as distinct 
categories.  At one level, this essay calls for a deeper, contextual, and 
nuanced effort to understand that differentiation, its sources, and its 
implications.  Yet I unify them, too, because legal and cultural practice has 
tried to do so.  Open source licenses, restrictive notices, and Creative 
Commons forms are referred to as licenses in both technical and common 
usage precisely because the imprimatur of the license label lends the form a 
presumptive legal and cultural legitimacy and authority.  In large part, this 
authority comes from the rhetoric and metaphor of knowledge as property, 
which brings with it tragedy and commons, exclusion and incentives.  To a 
related but lesser degree, this stems from the rhetoric and metaphor of 
knowledge as contract, or knowledge as bargain, which brings with it 
reciprocity and exchange and the proposition that knowledge is good 
largely when it is good for something. 
When knowledge takes a different rhetorical or metaphorical turn, so that 
the proverbial commons is a source of opportunity rather than a source of 
threat, or when the rhetoric or metaphor exhausts itself, as it may when we 
lack the ability to describe what knowledge is good for, the legitimacy and 
authority of the related conversation itself is called into doubt.  Language 
itself may lack the persuasiveness that comes with the immediacy of 
experience.  Note the reference here to form, to materiality, and to 
baselines.  It makes little conventional sense to speak of “licensing” books, 
because we have no common experience of restrictions on books.  Yet a 
 
 132. The “public domain” itself is only just now being explored as a conceptual and 
rhetorical category.  See Samuelson, supra note 16. 
 133. See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010). 
 134. See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(2007). 
 135. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?  Access, 
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008) 
(arguing that search law is indeed a meaningful and significant cultural and legal category). 
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Creative Commons license may be applied as readily to a book as to a 
website.  Can a book be licensed?  If so, by whom, and when? 
If property rights arise to create value lost from the failure to control 
knowledge, but some licenses serve to minimize the harm caused by 
controlling knowledge, then we encounter an apparent paradox.  Is the 
license an exercise of a property interest at all?136  It appears to have all the 
attributes of a formal license; it appears to be a form of “property” right.  
(What’s more, under Jacobsen, that open source property right is 
enforceable via an injunction, which economists call a form of “property” 
entitlement.) 137 But it neither depends on the rhetorical foundation of 
property nor solves a property-like problem.  The conundrum is both 
rhetorical and functional.  The point of the legal device is not to overcome a 
“tragic” problem of overconsumption and underproduction, but instead to 
manage the conservation of knowledge resources.  The license means not to 
enable growth and prosperity via controls on knowledge, but instead to 
control the harmful effects of those controls.  In that case, is the authority of 
the knowledge form based on the rhetoric of property?  Carol Rose recently 
hinted that the answer might be no.138  We might disregard the rhetoric and 
focus on the authority of function and form, but I pointed out earlier that 
those tactics run into borderlands of their own.  If conserving a knowledge 
commons is a default mode for conceptualizing and privatization the 
exception, or if privatization serves the interests of knowledge commons, 
can a single rhetoric of property adequately serve both modern and 
traditional knowledge concepts?  Perhaps not. 
Recall my example of the “single-use” camera.  One might ask how a 
camera differs from a book.  The response likely would be that the question 
makes little sense.  Yet that is precisely my claim.  Our rhetorical and 
metaphorical frames predispose us to deem the question largely but not 
entirely implausible.  Any given conversation about knowledge, even a 
conversation that frames the question in terms of geography, as I have done 
here, exhausts itself rhetorically at the point where we acquire and 
experience knowledge in forms and contexts that are literally 
unprecedented.  What happens when words fail us? 
B.  Further Explorations 
Belaboring the territorial metaphor at this point, having just critiqued its 
own rhetorical foundations, runs obvious risks.  I conclude this part with 
highly abbreviated comments pointing to some further borderlands to be 
explored. 
 
 136. Cf. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (describing the consequences of a 
superabundance of property interests in a single transactional domain). 
 137. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 138. See Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights:  Varieties of Public Infrastructure and 
Their Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409 (2008). 
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1.  Intermediaries 
My initial description of borderlands supposed that their conceptual and 
material contents are distinct from the identities of the parties whose 
interests are at stake.  But party and interest may overlap; identity and 
border intersect.  If licenses bridge competing conceptions of knowledge, 
then borderlands partly represent problems of intermediaries, rather than 
problems of production, distribution, consumption, and so forth.  What 
happens when individuals, firms, enterprises, and knowledge forms are 
simultaneously and necessarily both intermediaries and end points?  Their 
authority and legitimacy varies depending on their role.  Every one of the 
landmark licensing cases discussed in this essay presents some version of a 
knowledge intermediary at the same time that each of them simultaneously 
presents some version of a knowledge producer and consumer.  How should 
we conceive of multiple levels or types of legitimacy and authority 
simultaneously? 
2.  Custom and Convention 
The licensing cases above reflect and offer society’s two minds about the 
respective roles of individual and society in knowledge practices.  On the 
one hand, the rhetoric and much of the doctrines of copyright and patent 
law exalt the innovative and creative individual, without whom society 
would not be supplied with new knowledge.  There is no doubt that at one 
level, knowledge is embodied in the individual mind, and at a deep level its 
authority and legitimacy ultimately rest there and in the intentionality of the 
source.  Asset Marketing and implied licensing doctrine rely heavily on that 
proposition.  One ought not stop there.  Once we focus on the individual, 
we expose important questions of training, expertise, and professionalism, 
and questions of expert and amateur authority.139  On the other hand, 
virtually all knowledge is embodied in some institutional or material 
setting—firm, university, or household, for example—and knowledge 
practices are inevitably situated temporally amid lifetimes or generations of 
institutional presence.140 
This essay is situated in conventions of knowledge production and 
distribution that are inescapably social.  The proposition that there is such a 
thing as a geography of knowledge puts the cultural cart before the 
individual horse, in a manner of speaking.  Intellectual property debates are 
increasingly flavored by arguments over the role of social convention and 
custom, which might precede and inform legal practice, which might follow 
 
 139. See, e.g., Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 951 (2004) (celebrating the antihierarchy in knowledge production and 
distribution). 
 140. See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004) 
(examining the knowledge functions of the firm in transaction-cost terms); Dan L. Burk & 
Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:  Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at 
the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575. 
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and be informed by legal practice, and/or which might serve as a proxy for 
social welfare to be maximized by law and public policy (if that’s the 
functional guideline at stake).141  Licensing is a knowledge practice that 
speaks to and reflects a broad variety of social structures. 
3.  Space 
Space is the final frontier after all.142  Where knowledge comes from, 
where knowledge resides, and where knowledge goes are questions that are 
cumulative of each other, of course, not alternatives, and the answers 
depend both literally and metaphorically on how we understand knowledge 
to relate to its environmental and social context.  In a real sense, all of the 
borderlands described in this essay converge on this point, literally as well 
as metaphorically.  At the most basic, material level, knowledge may be 
deeply associated with specific places, even specific buildings.  Libraries 
are paradigm examples.  Think of the Library of Congress, the Bodleian at 
Oxford University, the original Library of Alexandria, and even Jorge Luis 
Borges’ fictional Library of Babel.  Knowledge is created and shared in 
classrooms and laboratories, in courtrooms and studios. 
What counts as a “place” is both physical and conceptual, and our sense 
of the authority of knowledge is often linked partly to its physicality and 
partly to the conceptual structures that we have come to associate with that 
physicality.  What I described above as forms, functions, materiality, 
baselines, and rhetorics come into play in building and sustaining these 
relationships.  Consider scientific research.  Scientific research produced by 
a team of academic researchers may have a different character than 
comparable scientific research produced by a commercial research and 
development lab, partly because we associate each with different (but 
related) locations, different (but related) communities of researchers, 
different (but related) expectations as to purpose and impact, and so on.143  
One is presumptively open, distributed, independent, and unbiased; the 
other is consolidated, centralized, and presumptively interested.  When 
these things are netted out, by historical standards, patents grounded in 
corporate research tend to be presumptively legitimate in cultural terms.  
The commercial world is part of the intellectual property system, in a sense 
that is metaphorically spatial as well as simply conceptual.  Universities are 
not.  Patents grounded in university research are suspect. 
 
 141. For contrasting views on the welfare benefits of social conventions and customs, 
compare Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1525 (2004) (arguing that patterned social activity is likely to produce creative output), 
with Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 1899 (2007) (expressing skepticism about incorporating customary uses into 
intellectual property law). 
 142. Sorry.  Otherwise, never mind. 
 143. Katherine Strandburg’s contribution to this Symposium explores this issue. See 
Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms:  At the Boundary Between 
Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009). 
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Those standards are changing, in part because the material and 
conceptual conventions of place and space as bases for knowledge change 
as they connect to and overlap with contests over centralization and 
distribution, markets and competition, and baseline expectations.  In many 
places around the world (led by Stanford University, in the Silicon Valley, 
and by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
in Cambridge), the spatial integration of the university community and the 
surrounding commercial research community means that historical contrasts 
between open university science and closed commercial science are 
becoming less stark.  Patenting by university researchers becomes more 
acceptable as universities themselves look and act less like nurturers of 
open inquiry and more like hubs of downstream knowledge exploitation.  
University research has not lost its legitimacy and authority, but its forms of 
legitimacy and authority connect to the intellectual property system in new, 
distinct ways.  Patents generated by university researchers are not 
necessarily suspect.144 
CONCLUSION:  THE STAKES OF GEOGRAPHY AND THE ROADS AHEAD 
Questions about intellectual property law and policy, and questions about 
different modes of intellectual property protection and different social 
forms of innovation, represent a subset of questions about the nature of 
knowledge itself.  Answering the first set of questions does not require 
answering the second, and answering the second does not necessarily entail 
answering the first.  But there is a natural and provocative relationship 
between the two that deserves exploration, principally because it can help 
us understand the limits of understanding both of them.  Intellectual 
property law and policy are difficult and challenging in their own right, but 
it turns out that the difficulty and challenge is not due merely to ambiguities 
and conflicts that are internal to the structures of those fields.  There is 
something broader at work, and exploring some broader themes in 
knowledge itself helps us to see what that is.  Our anxiety about the 
mechanics of knowledge law is grounded in anxiety about the nature of 
knowledge itself.  A close examination of even a small sample of recent 
American court opinions suggests some of the key dimensions of that 
anxiety. 
This essay is framed as a geography because the exploratory metaphor 
associated with space seems to suit the topic.  Lawyers and scholars in 
intellectual property domains often underestimate the complexity of the 
 
 144. Patent and copyright law illustrate but do not exhaust a geography of knowledge 
defined by connections between legitimacy in knowledge and legitimacy in law.  Research 
conducted by or under the auspices of corporate sponsors may be culturally suspect for other 
reasons or in other contexts.  The Supreme Court recently declined to give weight to research 
on the predictability of punitive damages awards, on the ground that the research was funded 
in part by Exxon. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2626 n. 17 (2008). 
MADISON FINAL3 (LOOKS GOOD ON FRANKS COMP) 3/31/2009  2:18:04 AM 
2084 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
epistemological terrain on which they tread.145  Philosophers of knowledge 
and social scientists studying knowledge questions may fail to appreciate 
how their interests intersect with some very concrete yet surprisingly 
complex topics in law and policy (or, they may appreciate the intersection 
but knowingly decide that investigating it is not important or relevant).  The 
intersection between the two worlds is a contested space.  Not only do law 
and policy domains illuminate centuries-old epistemological questions, but 
a complex epistemological terrain lies beneath law and policy questions 
themselves.  There is clearly something to a methodological approach to 
knowledge and law that focuses on knowledge forms and practices.146  
Intellectual property rights and practices depend on authority and 
legitimacy of knowledge generally; and authority and legitimacy are 
manifested in day-to-day behaviors, forms, and practices, as well as in 
belief.  The same might be said, and perhaps eventually will be said, of 
other questions of knowledge law and policy:  free speech, privacy, 
telecommunications, data security, and others. 
What next? 
A geography of knowledge needs more landmarks and more details to 
flesh out the territories we know.  It needs to fill in some of the empty 
spaces and to refine what we do not know.  Some of those can come from 
closer and deeper examination of legal forms and legal practices.  Some of 
those can come from closer and deeper examination of social practices147 
and related institutions.  Some of those can come from closer and deeper 
examination of processes of individual knowledge processing, where 
innovation and creativity are situated in ourselves, and how we convert 
knowledge of one sort (creativity, for example) into knowledge of another 
sort (landmarks).  Much more work can be done mapping the territorial 
interstices of knowledge. 
The end game is partly knowledge about knowledge for its own sake.  
Partly, also, it is knowledge about knowledge with a purpose.  By 
identifying and describing patterns of stability and change, of individuals 
 
 145. This statement should not be understood as a critique of any particular discipline or 
group of scholars.  To the extent that this essay is addressed to a particular problem, it is 
addressed to a kind of Newtonian conceit, that there exists a reliable and knowable 
mechanism by which social, cultural, and economic questions can be linked to law reform 
answers. 
 146. Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and The Law of 
Evidence:  Reply to Redmayne, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 885 (defending application of 
naturalized epistemology to evidence law research); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, 
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1537–49 (2001) 
(applying techniques of naturalized epistemology to specific doctrines in the law of evidence 
or, in lay terms, linking the empirics of evidence law to the nature of knowledge).  Note that 
I frame the discussion in this essay in terms of social and cultural treatments of knowledge, 
rather than in terms of knowledge as truth. 
 147. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore):  
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up 
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators:  
Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008). 
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and culture, of law, materials, and society, and of models and details, we 
can approach specific knowledge law and policy problems with a more 
sophisticated guide.  What authority is salient, stable, and legitimate in 
knowledge contexts, and where does that salience, stability, and legitimacy 
come from?  Keeping with the spatial metaphor, where does it go? 
 
